Pitsilides v. Barr

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Docket: 21-3320

Opinion Date: February 10, 2025

Judge: Cheryl Ann Krause

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

George Pitsilides, a successful restaurateur and professional poker player, was convicted in 1998 in Pennsylvania for criminal conspiracy to commit pool selling and bookmaking, and two counts of pool selling and bookmaking. These offenses are classified as first-degree misdemeanors in Pennsylvania, punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment. Consequently, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Pitsilides is barred from possessing a firearm. Despite these convictions, Pitsilides continued to engage in illegal gambling activities, leading to further convictions in Virginia in 2011 for operating an illegal gambling enterprise.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, applying the two-step framework from Binderup v. Attorney General. The court concluded that Pitsilides failed to show his convictions were not serious and rejected his argument that his offenses fell within the carveout for business-related offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that the legal landscape had changed significantly since the District Court's decision, particularly with the Supreme Court's rulings in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and the Third Circuit's en banc decision in Range v. Attorney General. These cases emphasized the need for individualized assessments of whether a felon poses a danger to public safety when challenging firearm prohibitions under the Second Amendment.

The Third Circuit concluded that the record was insufficient to determine whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Pitsilides. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case to the District Court for further factual development to assess whether Pitsilides poses a special danger of misusing firearms.

Parker v. Hooper

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-30825

Opinion Date: February 12, 2025

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Class Action, Constitutional Law, Health Law

In this case, inmates at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (LSP) filed a class action lawsuit in 2015 against the warden, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and other officials. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs, violating the Eighth Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court bifurcated the case into liability and remedy phases. After an eleven-day bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs on all claims. Subsequently, a ten-day trial on remedies concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to permanent injunctive relief, but the court did not specify the relief in its judgment.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana entered a "Judgment" in favor of the plaintiffs and a "Remedial Order" outlining the appointment of special masters to develop remedial plans. The defendants appealed, arguing that the district court's judgment and remedial order were final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or, alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the district court had not entered a final decision appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, nor had it entered an injunction appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The appellate court determined that the district court's actions were not final because they contemplated further proceedings, including the appointment of special masters and the development of remedial plans. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and vacated the stay of the remedial order.

USA v. Peterson

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-30043

Opinion Date: February 6, 2025

Judge: Jennifer Elrod

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

George Peterson was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) for illegal firearm transactions at his business, PDW Solutions, LLC, which he operated from his home. The ATF conducted undercover operations where Peterson sold firearms without reporting the transactions as required. Based on this, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to search Peterson's home and business. During the search, agents found an unregistered firearm suppressor in Peterson's bedroom-closet safe. Peterson was indicted for possession of an unregistered suppressor.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana denied Peterson's pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment on Second Amendment grounds and to suppress the evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. Peterson argued that the National Firearms Act's (NFA) registration requirement for suppressors violated his Second Amendment rights and that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The district court rejected these arguments, and Peterson entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that suppressors are not "Arms" protected by the Second Amendment, as they are accessories and not weapons themselves. Therefore, the NFA's registration requirement does not violate the Second Amendment. Additionally, the court found that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied, as the officers reasonably relied on the warrant issued by the magistrate judge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Peterson's motions to dismiss and suppress.

Virden v. City of Austin

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50697

Opinion Date: February 10, 2025

Judge: James C. Ho

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law

Jennifer Virden, a small business owner in Austin, Texas, ran for city council in 2020 and for mayor in 2022. The City of Austin has a regulation that prohibits candidates from fundraising outside a one-year period before the general election. Virden announced her candidacy for the 2022 election in March 2021, which was seven months before she could start fundraising under the ordinance. She filed a lawsuit challenging the one-year fundraising window as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas initially denied Virden's request for a preliminary injunction, finding no irreparable harm. Virden's interlocutory appeal was dismissed as moot after the fundraising window opened. The district court later granted summary judgment in part, ruling that the one-year fundraising window was unconstitutional and awarding nominal damages to Virden and her donor, William Clark. The court found that the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot since the 2022 election had ended and there were no concrete plans for future campaigns. The court also refused to consider evidence regarding Virden's desire to contribute to another candidate in the 2024 election, deeming the submission untimely.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the one-year fundraising window was unconstitutional, agreeing that it violated the First Amendment. The court also upheld the award of nominal damages to Virden and Clark. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the late evidence regarding the 2024 election. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the suit was timely, Virden had standing, and the city's arguments were without merit. The court affirmed the district court's decision in its entirety.

Cooperrider v. Woods

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 24-5351

Opinion Date: February 7, 2025

Judge: Karen Moore

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

In March 2020, Andrew Cooperrider, owner of Brewed, a coffee shop and bar in Lexington, Kentucky, criticized Governor Beshear’s COVID-19 policies on social media. In November 2020, the Kentucky Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC) suspended Brewed’s alcohol license, and officially revoked it in March 2022. Cooperrider filed a lawsuit against Governor Beshear, DABC officials, and other state officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and due-process violations, claiming the license revocation was in retaliation for his critical speech.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky dismissed the case, granting the defendants' motions to dismiss. The court found that most of Cooperrider’s claims were barred by absolute, qualified, and sovereign immunity. It also determined that Cooperrider’s remaining substantive-due-process claim did not meet the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading standard.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of most claims, agreeing that the defendants were protected by absolute, qualified, and sovereign immunity. However, the appellate court found that the district court improperly granted qualified immunity to Governor Beshear, Ray Perry, and Wesley Duke regarding Cooperrider’s First Amendment retaliation claim. The appellate court held that Cooperrider had plausibly alleged that the enforcement action against Brewed was motivated by his protected speech. Consequently, the court reversed the district court’s decision on this point and remanded the case for further proceedings on the First Amendment retaliation claim.

United States v. Taylor

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Docket: 23-5834

Opinion Date: February 7, 2025

Judge: Andre Mathis

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Quincy Taylor was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The charges stemmed from an incident where Taylor was involved in a car accident, and a witness, William Howell, testified that Taylor had a bag containing drugs and a firearm. Howell's testimony was the only evidence linking Taylor to the contraband.

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky limited Taylor's ability to cross-examine Howell about his criminal history and potential bias. Specifically, the court allowed Taylor to ask if Howell had any felony convictions but prohibited questions about the nature of the conviction, Howell's pending felon-in-possession charge, and any benefits Howell might receive for his cooperation. Taylor argued that these limitations violated his Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court's limitations on cross-examination violated Taylor's constitutional right to confront witnesses. The court determined that the jury did not have sufficient information to assess Howell's potential bias and motive for testifying. The court also found that the error was not harmless, as Howell's testimony was crucial to the prosecution's case, and there was no other evidence linking Taylor to the contraband.

As a result, the Sixth Circuit reversed Taylor's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the district court's limitations on cross-examination violated Taylor's Confrontation Clause rights and that the error was not harmless.

United States v. Frazier

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

Docket: 23-2641

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Michael Scudder

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Kein Eastman was abducted at gunpoint from his grandmother’s house by Kenwyn Frazier, taken to an apartment in East St. Louis, and subjected to threats, beatings, and a gunshot over a piece of jewelry. Eastman fled the scene with a bloodied face and has not been seen since. Kenwyn and his brother Kendrick Frazier were charged with kidnapping and found guilty by a jury. They appealed on several grounds, including a violation of Kendrick’s Sixth Amendment right to his choice of counsel, the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute, the sufficiency of the evidence, and aspects of their sentencing.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the Fraziers' motion to dismiss the indictment and their post-trial motions for acquittal or a new trial. The court also applied a four-level sentencing enhancement, finding that Eastman sustained permanent or life-threatening bodily injury. Kendrick’s request for joint representation by attorney Beau Brindley was denied due to potential conflicts of interest, and he retained separate counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in denying Kendrick’s choice of counsel, given the potential for conflicts of interest. The court upheld the constitutionality of the federal kidnapping statute, citing precedent that the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, such as cars and cellphones, suffices for federal jurisdiction. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Kendrick’s conviction for aiding and abetting the kidnapping. Lastly, the court affirmed the application of the sentencing enhancement, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding that Eastman sustained a permanent or life-threatening injury.

K. J. V. JACKSON

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-3052

Opinion Date: February 11, 2025

Judge: Richard Paez

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education Law

A high school student, K.J., was involved in a fight on campus and was initially suspended for three days. After reviewing surveillance footage and learning about injuries sustained during the fight, school officials extended K.J.'s suspension and recommended his expulsion, without informing him of the new charges or evidence. K.J. was not given an opportunity to respond to these new allegations.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that the school officials violated K.J.'s procedural due process rights by not informing him of the new charges or evidence. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established regarding due process protections for suspension extensions. The court also held that K.J. lacked standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record, as it was speculative that the record would harm his reputation or future prospects.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit agreed that K.J.'s due process rights were violated, as he was not given notice of the new charges or an opportunity to respond. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the requirements for due process in school suspensions were clearly established in Goss v. Lopez. The court also held that K.J. had standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record and that such relief was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The case was remanded to the district court to consider K.J.'s claims for damages and expungement.

OLSON V. COUNTY OF GRANT

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Docket: 23-35365

Opinion Date: February 10, 2025

Judge: Margaret McKeown

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

Haley Olson was arrested in Idaho for marijuana possession and consented to a search of her phone by Idaho police, who created a copy of its contents. Glenn Palmer, then-Sheriff of Grant County, Oregon, learned of the arrest and, curious about Olson's relationship with Grant County Deputy Tyler Smith, asked County Attorney Jim Carpenter to request the phone extraction from the Idaho prosecutor. Carpenter obtained and reviewed the extraction, allegedly deleting it afterward. However, Olson later heard gossip about the contents of her phone, including nude photos, seemingly originating from the sheriff’s office. Olson sued Palmer, Carpenter, and Grant County, alleging Fourth Amendment violations.

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment for Palmer, finding no supervisory liability, and for Carpenter, granting him qualified immunity as his actions did not violate clearly established law. Olson appealed these decisions.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court agreed that Palmer was not liable due to lack of supervisory authority over Carpenter. The court also held that Carpenter was entitled to qualified immunity because Olson’s right to be free from Carpenter’s search was not clearly established at the time. However, the court concluded that Carpenter’s search did violate Olson’s Fourth Amendment rights, as it was conducted without a warrant, consent, or suspicion of criminal activity. The court emphasized the importance of developing constitutional precedent in this area, despite affirming the grant of qualified immunity to Carpenter.

United States v. Gregory

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Dockets: 22-12800, 22-12809, 22-12843

Opinion Date: February 13, 2025

Judge: Andrew Brasher

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

The case involves the appeals of Rolando Williamson, Hendarius Archie, Ishmywel Gregory, and Adrien Taylor, who were convicted of various drug distribution and conspiracy charges. Williamson argued that the district court erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence obtained from warrants to search his house and apartment, claiming the use of pole cameras violated the Fourth Amendment. Archie contended that the district court allowed improper opinion testimony from a case agent. Gregory challenged the district court’s findings on the type and amount of drugs attributable to him at sentencing. All defendants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their conspiracy convictions.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama convicted the defendants on multiple counts. Williamson was sentenced to life imprisonment for several counts, including engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Taylor was convicted of distributing methamphetamine and using a communication facility to commit a drug trafficking crime. Gregory was convicted of distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute drugs. Archie was convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the use of pole cameras did not violate Williamson’s Fourth Amendment rights as they surveilled areas exposed to the public. The court found that the case agent’s opinion testimony did not affect Archie’s substantial rights. The evidence was deemed sufficient to support each defendant’s conspiracy conviction. However, Williamson’s conspiracy conviction was vacated as it was a lesser-included offense of his continuing criminal enterprise conviction. Gregory’s sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing as it exceeded the statutory maximum. The court affirmed the remaining convictions and sentences.

Rivera v. State

Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Docket: S-18787

Opinion Date: February 7, 2025

Judge: Jude Pate

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law

Joseph Rivera's driver's license was permanently revoked by New York authorities after he was convicted of three alcohol-related driving offenses between 2000 and 2010. Rivera moved to Alaska in 2011 but did not apply for an Alaska driver's license until 2021. His application was denied by the Alaska Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) because his license was still revoked in New York. Rivera sought reinstatement of his driving privileges in New York, but his requests were denied. He then requested an administrative hearing with the Alaska DMV, which upheld the denial of his application.

Rivera appealed to the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, arguing that the DMV misapplied Alaska's licensing statutes and that the statutes conflicted. The superior court affirmed the DMV's decision, rejecting Rivera's arguments.

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and held that Alaska's driver’s license statutes do not conflict. The court found that the statutes operate in harmony, with the Compact providing a framework for considering out-of-state driving records and Alaska's statutes imposing additional requirements. Specifically, Alaska Statute 28.15.031(b)(1) prevents the DMV from issuing a license to anyone whose driving privileges are revoked in any jurisdiction, including out-of-state revocations. The court concluded that the DMV properly applied this statute in denying Rivera's application.

The court also addressed Rivera's arguments regarding equal protection and manifest injustice, finding them unpersuasive. The court noted that Rivera had not exhausted all available appeals in New York and that the DMV's decision did not result in manifest injustice. Consequently, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court's judgment and upheld the DMV's decision to deny Rivera's application for a driver's license.

Civil Rights Dept. v. Cathy's Creations

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F085800(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: February 11, 2025

Judge: Kathleen Meehan

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law

A bakery refused to sell a predesigned white cake to a same-sex couple for their wedding reception, citing a policy against providing cakes for same-sex weddings based on the owner's religious beliefs. The California Civil Rights Department (CRD) filed a lawsuit on behalf of the couple, alleging discrimination under the Unruh Civil Rights Act (UCRA). The trial court ruled in favor of the bakery, finding no violation of the UCRA because the CRD failed to prove intentional discrimination and concluded that referring the couple to another bakery constituted full and equal access under the UCRA. The trial court also considered the bakery's First Amendment defenses, concluding that the UCRA compelled the bakery to speak a message about marriage to which they objected.

The CRD appealed, challenging the trial court's interpretation and application of the UCRA and its conclusions regarding the bakery's affirmative defenses. The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and determined that the bakery's policy was not facially neutral and misconstrued the intentional discrimination standard. The court found that the policy was inherently discriminatory as it required a distinction in service based on the sexual orientation of the end user. The court also concluded that referring the couple to another bakery did not satisfy the UCRA's full and equal access requirement.

The court further analyzed the bakery's First Amendment defenses, determining that the cake in question did not constitute pure speech or expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. The court found that the cake was a generic, multi-purpose product and that its preparation and delivery did not convey any particularized message about marriage. Additionally, the court concluded that the UCRA is a neutral and generally applicable law that satisfies rational basis review and does not violate the bakery's free exercise of religion under the federal or state constitutions.

The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Densmore v. People

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Docket: 23SC81

Opinion Date: February 10, 2025

Judge: Richard Gabriel

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In February 2017, Adam Douglas Densmore lived in Boulder with his child and the child's mother, Ashley Mead. After Mead went missing, Densmore was arrested in Oklahoma with the child. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services took custody of the child, and caseworker Jessica Punches interviewed Densmore at the jail without providing Miranda warnings. Punches's role was to ensure the child's safety and find appropriate placement, not to conduct criminal investigations.

The trial court denied Densmore's motion to suppress his statements to Punches, finding that she was not acting as an agent of law enforcement. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a totality of the circumstances test and concluding that Punches's primary duties were related to child welfare, not law enforcement.

The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case to determine if Miranda v. Arizona applies when a Department of Human Services caseworker conducts a custodial interrogation. The court concluded that courts must consider the totality of the circumstances, including both objective and subjective factors, to determine if a caseworker acted as an agent of law enforcement. Applying this standard, the court found that Punches did not act as an agent of law enforcement and was not required to provide Miranda warnings. The court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Ford v. State

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Docket: SC2025-0110

Opinion Date: February 7, 2025

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

James D. Ford was convicted of the 1997 murders of Greg and Kimberly Malnory at a sod farm in South Florida. Ford, who worked with Greg, had planned to go fishing with the couple. Greg was shot in the head, beaten, and had his throat slit. Kimberly was raped, beaten, and shot. Their young daughter was found nearby, unharmed but exposed to the elements. Ford was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, sexual battery with a firearm, and child abuse, and was sentenced to death.

Ford's convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2002. Ford has since filed multiple unsuccessful postconviction relief motions in state and federal courts. His third successive motion for postconviction relief, filed under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, was summarily denied by the circuit court. This motion raised claims that his death sentence was unconstitutional under Roper v. Simmons due to his mental and developmental age and that executing him would violate his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in light of Erlinger v. United States.

The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's denial. The court held that Ford's claim regarding his mental and developmental age was untimely and without merit, as Roper does not extend to individuals over eighteen, regardless of mental age. The court also found that Erlinger, which involved the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, was not applicable to Ford's case. Additionally, the court rejected Ford's arguments related to Hurst v. Florida and Hurst v. State, noting that these decisions do not apply retroactively to Ford's case. The court concluded that Ford's claims were procedurally barred and meritless, and affirmed the denial of his third successive motion for postconviction relief.

F.S. v. Missouri Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole

Court: Supreme Court of Missouri

Docket: SC100558

Opinion Date: February 11, 2025

Judge: Robin Ransom

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

F.S. was found guilty by a jury of statutory sodomy of an 11-year-old victim and sentenced to five years in prison. After completing her sentence and parole, she was subjected to lifetime electronic monitoring by the Missouri Department of Corrections under section 217.735. This monitoring involves wearing an ankle bracelet that tracks her location via GPS. F.S. challenged the constitutionality of this lifetime monitoring requirement, arguing it violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

The Circuit Court of Cole County upheld the constitutionality of section 217.735. During the bench trial, the court received stipulated facts, exhibits, and testimony from experts. The court found that GPS monitoring can deter recidivism among sex offenders by enforcing exclusion zones and increasing the certainty of legal repercussions. The court also noted that F.S. had not reoffended since completing parole but found that sex offenders with child victims tend to reoffend over a longer period. The court concluded that the GPS monitoring was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, given F.S.'s diminished expectation of privacy as a convicted sex offender and the state's legitimate interest in protecting potential victims.

The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that F.S. failed to present particularized evidence showing that section 217.735 was unconstitutionally applied to her circumstances. The court emphasized that F.S.'s status as a female offender and her lack of reoffending did not suffice to demonstrate that the statute was unreasonable as applied to her. The court concluded that the statute did not clearly contravene any specific constitutional provision and upheld the lifetime monitoring requirement.

State v. Lee

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2025 MT 30

Opinion Date: February 11, 2025

Judge: Cory S. Swanson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Garrett Alan Lee, a 25-year-old, engaged in an online conversation with an undercover law enforcement officer posing as a 12-year-old girl. Lee discussed meeting the girl for sex and was apprehended by law enforcement when he arrived at the arranged location. He was charged with Sexual Abuse of Children under Montana law and pleaded guilty.

The Thirteenth Judicial District Court sentenced Lee to 100 years at the Montana State Prison, with 65 years suspended, and imposed a 25-year parole restriction. Lee appealed, arguing that the mandatory 25-year parole restriction was unconstitutional and that the District Court violated his due process rights by considering information from a prior psychosexual examination not admitted into evidence.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that Lee's constitutional and statutory arguments concerning the mandatory parole restriction were not properly before the court because he was not sentenced under the mandatory minimum provision. Instead, the District Court imposed the parole restriction under its discretionary sentencing power. The court also found that Lee's due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to rebut or correct any information in the presentence investigation report, and the information was not materially false.

The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's judgment, concluding that Lee's sentence was legal and within the statutory parameters. The court declined to review the constitutional and statutory claims related to the mandatory parole restriction and did not find plain error in the due process claim.

Andrews v. Lombardi

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-243

Opinion Date: February 12, 2025

Judge: Maureen McKenna Goldberg

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Health Law

The plaintiffs, retired police officers and firefighters, challenged the constitutionality of a 2011 Medicare Ordinance enacted by the City of Providence, which required retirees to enroll in Medicare upon eligibility and terminated city-paid health care coverage for Medicare-eligible retirees. The plaintiffs, who opted out of a settlement agreement that provided certain Medicare-related benefits, sought retroactive reimbursement for out-of-pocket health care expenses incurred during the litigation.

The Superior Court initially granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, denied relief on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews II remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment consistent with the specific provisions of the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not include retroactive reimbursement for health care expenses.

Upon remand, the plaintiffs sought reimbursement for out-of-pocket expenses, but the Superior Court denied this request, concluding that such relief was outside the scope of the Supreme Court's mandate in Andrews II. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that the mandate in Andrews II did not contemplate or include retroactive relief for health care expenses. The Court emphasized that the mandate was prospective in nature and aligned with the 2013 Final and Consent Judgment, which did not provide for reimbursement of past expenses. The Court also noted that the plaintiffs had waived claims for individual damages during the trial and had not sought such damages in their amended complaint.

Andrews v. Lombardi

Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Docket: 22-244

Opinion Date: February 12, 2025

Judge: Paul Suttell

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts

In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.

The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.

The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims.