Torres-Estrada v. United States

Court: US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Docket: 19-1485

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Kermit Lipez

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the appellant, Elvin Torres-Estrada, was charged in a superseding indictment with conspiring to distribute controlled substances and other related offenses. Plea negotiations began, and the government offered a plea deal allowing Torres-Estrada to request a 188-month sentence. However, one of his attorneys, Ramón Garcia, advised him to counteroffer for a lower sentence and assured him that he could negotiate a better deal. This advice conflicted with the recommendations of Torres-Estrada's other attorneys, who believed the government's offer was favorable and urged him to accept it promptly.

The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico initially handled the case. Torres-Estrada followed Garcia's advice, leading to a series of counteroffers and negotiations that ultimately did not result in a more favorable plea deal. Instead, Torres-Estrada later signed a consolidated plea agreement for a 264-month sentence, with the government allowed to argue for 288 months. The district court sentenced him to 288 months. Torres-Estrada filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the district court denied.

The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court examined whether Garcia's advice and actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards set by Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper. The court found that while Garcia's conduct was problematic, it did not meet the threshold for constitutionally deficient performance. Additionally, the court concluded that Torres-Estrada failed to demonstrate that he would have accepted the government's original plea offer but for Garcia's advice. Therefore, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of sentencing relief.

United States v. Ashley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40482

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Elrod

Areas of Law: Banking, Criminal Law, White Collar Crime

Keith Todd Ashley, a licensed financial advisor, was charged and convicted on 17 counts of violating federal law, including mail and wire fraud, Hobbs Act robbery, and bank theft. He operated a Ponzi scheme and allegedly murdered one of his clients to steal funds from the client’s bank account and benefit from the client’s life insurance proceeds. The district court sentenced Ashley to 240 months’ imprisonment for each of 15 counts of wire and mail fraud and imposed life sentences for his convictions of Hobbs Act robbery and bank theft.

In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Ashley was found guilty on all counts presented. He filed motions for continuance and severance, which were denied by the district court. The jury found Ashley guilty on all counts, and the district court sentenced him accordingly. Ashley then appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for most of his convictions, the reasonableness of his sentence, and the denial of his motions for continuance and severance.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The government conceded that there was insufficient evidence to convict Ashley of five counts and that the life-sentence enhancement for his conviction of bank theft did not apply. The Fifth Circuit agreed, affirming some of Ashley’s convictions, vacating others, and remanding the case for resentencing and further proceedings. Specifically, the court affirmed Ashley’s convictions on Counts 1, 3, 14, and 19, vacated his convictions on Counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, and 18, and remanded for resentencing. The court also addressed Ashley’s challenges to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the cumulative error doctrine but found no reversible error in those respects.

United States v. Borino

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 22-30747

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Kurt Engelhardt

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Tax Law, White Collar Crime

Joseph Anthony Borino, as part of a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony (wire fraud) on July 8, 2021. He was sentenced to one year and one day of imprisonment on November 1, 2022. On March 30, 2023, the district court ordered restitution of $21,223,036.37 under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), to be paid jointly and severally with Denis Joachim, Borino’s employer and co-conspirator.

The district court proceedings began with the indictment of Denis and Donna Joachim in August 2018, followed by Borino’s separate indictment in November 2019. Borino was charged with conspiracy to defraud the IRS, making false statements, and wire fraud. He later pleaded guilty to misprision of a felony in June 2021. The district court adopted the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) which attributed the entire loss of $25,543,340.78 to Borino, and scheduled a separate restitution hearing. At the restitution hearing, the court calculated the restitution amount based on the fees paid by the victims during the period of Borino’s offense, minus the claims paid by TTFG.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed Borino’s appeal, where he challenged the restitution order on three grounds: the applicability of the MVRA to his offense, the proof of actual pecuniary loss to the victims, and the causation of the losses. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, holding that the MVRA applied to Borino’s misprision offense because it involved concealment of wire fraud, a crime committed by fraud or deceit. The court found that the government had sufficiently proven the victims’ actual losses and that Borino’s continuous concealment of the fraud directly and proximately caused the victims’ losses. The court concluded that the district court did not err in ordering restitution of $21,223,036.37.

United States v. Butler

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-60594

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Elrod

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Betty Butler pleaded guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm after being convicted of a felony. This charge stemmed from a DEA search warrant executed at her home, where agents found a firearm and a small amount of marijuana. Butler admitted to possessing the firearm. She was subsequently indicted and charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, with the government alleging that she qualified for a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) due to her prior serious drug offenses.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi conducted a factual inquiry into Butler’s prior convictions and determined that she had at least three convictions for serious drug offenses committed on different occasions. This finding enhanced her sentence to a statutory minimum of 180 months in prison under the ACCA. Butler objected, arguing that a jury should determine whether her prior offenses occurred on different occasions, but the district court overruled her objections based on existing precedent.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decision in Erlinger v. United States required a jury to resolve the ACCA’s “different occasions” inquiry unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the lack of a jury determination in Butler’s case was harmless error. The court reasoned that any rational jury would have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Butler committed her previous serious drug offenses on different occasions based on the entire record. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed Butler’s sentence and the district court’s final judgment.

United States v. Keller

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-40338

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Elrod

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Andre Louis Keller drove to a permanent immigration checkpoint where a Customs & Border Protection (CBP) canine alerted to his vehicle. Upon searching, agents found an alien unlawfully present in the United States concealed under luggage. Keller conditionally pleaded guilty and appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence found in the vehicle.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas held a hearing on Keller’s motion to suppress. Testimonies were provided by CBP Agent Jesse Sandoval, Matthew B. Devaney from CBP’s Canine Academy, and Andre Falco Jimenez, a private police dog trainer. The district court denied Keller’s motion, leading to his conditional guilty plea. Keller was sentenced to 20 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. He then appealed the suppression ruling.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that stopping a vehicle for brief questioning at a permanent immigration checkpoint is not a Fourth Amendment search and does not require probable cause. The court found that the canine’s alert provided probable cause to search Keller’s vehicle. The court also concluded that the canine’s actions did not constitute an unlawful search and that the district court did not err in its ruling. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Keller’s motion to suppress.

United States v. Morales

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 24-20088

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Jennifer Elrod

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Enrique Morales was sentenced to 188 months in prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to operate an illegal money-transmitting business and conspiracy to launder funds. His presentence report calculated a total offense level of 41, including a four-level enhancement for his role as an organizer/leader of criminal activity. Morales had no criminal history points, resulting in a guideline range of 324 to 405 months, which was adjusted to 300 months due to statutory maximums. The government recommended a downward departure for his substantial assistance, and the district court sentenced him to 188 months in total.

Morales filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the new zero-point-offender provision of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which allows for a decrease in offense level for certain offenders. The district court denied the motion, stating that Morales was ineligible for the reduction because he had received an aggravating-role adjustment under USSG § 3B1.1(a).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that to qualify for the zero-point-offender reduction under USSG § 4C1.1, a defendant must meet all criteria, including not having received an adjustment under § 3B1.1 and not being engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise. Since Morales received a § 3B1.1 adjustment, he was ineligible for the reduction. The court concluded that either receiving a § 3B1.1 adjustment or engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise is sufficient to disqualify a defendant from the reduction. Thus, the district court's judgment was affirmed.

United States v. Rao

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-10670

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Stephen Higginson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Health Law, White Collar Crime

Sekhar Rao was involved in a scheme to defraud TRICARE, a federal health benefit plan, by ordering medically unnecessary toxicology and DNA cancer screening tests. These tests were billed to TRICARE through a shell company, ADAR Group, LLC, which set up fraudulent testing sites. Rao, a physician, was hired to sign off on these tests without reviewing patient medical information or meeting the patients. He was paid per test ordered. The scheme involved using a signature stamp of Rao’s signature to sign requisition forms, which Rao allegedly knew about and consented to.

In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Rao was acquitted of conspiracy to commit health care fraud but was convicted of two counts of substantive health care fraud related to specific fraudulent claims submitted to TRICARE. The district court sentenced him to 48 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release, and calculated the loss amount under the United States Sentencing Guidelines based on the intended loss.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. Rao raised three issues on appeal: the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions, the exclusion of testimony regarding statements made to him by the scheme’s leader about legal vetting, and the calculation of the loss amount under the Sentencing Guidelines. The Fifth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court’s decisions. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Rao caused the submission of the fraudulent claims and that he knew about and authorized the use of his signature stamp. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err in excluding the testimony about legal vetting and did not err in calculating the intended loss amount. The Fifth Circuit affirmed Rao’s convictions and sentence.

United States v. Vega-Santos

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Docket: 23-50309

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Carl Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In June 2022, Juan Jose Vega-Santos was charged with illegal reentry into the United States following removal, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)–(b). He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. The district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison, an upward variance from the advisory guidelines range, and imposed three years of supervised release with special conditions, including a requirement to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and participate in sex offender treatment if recommended by an evaluator.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas imposed the special condition as part of Vega-Santos's supervised release due to his prior felony conviction for sexual intercourse with a minor. Vega-Santos did not challenge this condition in the district court. On appeal, he argued that the condition constituted an unlawful delegation of the district court’s sentencing authority and was impermissibly ambiguous.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the special condition requiring Vega-Santos to participate in sex offender treatment if recommended by an evaluator constituted an unlawful delegation of judicial authority. The court noted that the imposition of a sentence, including the terms and conditions of supervised release, is a core judicial function that cannot be delegated. The court found that the district court's error was clear or obvious and affected Vega-Santos's substantial rights. The error also seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the special condition and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing consistent with its opinion.

Quito-Guachichulca v. Garland

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-1069

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: David Stras

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

Simon Quito-Guachichulca, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota law. Following his conviction, the government initiated removal proceedings, arguing that his crime was an "aggravated felony" under federal law, making him deportable. Initially, the government classified the crime as a "crime of violence," but the Supreme Court's decision in Sessions v. Dimaya rendered that classification impermissibly vague. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit vacated the removal order and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) for reconsideration.

On remand, the government reclassified Quito's crime as "rape," another type of "aggravated felony." Both an immigration judge and the BIA agreed with this classification. Quito then petitioned for review, arguing that the government’s change in theory violated the doctrine of res judicata. The Eighth Circuit found that res judicata did not apply because there was no final judgment on the merits due to the vacated order.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct statute fits the federal definition of "rape" under immigration law. The court applied the categorical approach, examining the statutory elements rather than Quito's actual conduct. The court determined that the federal definition of "rape" in 1996 did not include digital or mechanical penetration, which is covered under Minnesota’s statute. Therefore, the court concluded that there was a categorical mismatch between the state and federal definitions.

The Eighth Circuit granted Quito's petition for review, vacated the BIA's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that Minnesota’s third-degree criminal sexual conduct does not qualify as "rape" under federal immigration law.

United States v. Mims

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-2884

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Ralph Erickson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted Derek Mims, Elmer Mims, David Belton, and Anton Whitney for conspiracy to distribute pure methamphetamine. Whitney was also charged with possession of a firearm by a drug user, and Belton was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and drug user. Derek, Belton, and Whitney entered conditional guilty pleas, while a jury found Elmer guilty. The defendants appealed the district court's denial of motions to suppress evidence from wiretaps, a motion to recuse, and, in Belton's case, a motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search. Elmer also appealed the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction and the length of his sentence, while Derek and Whitney challenged their sentences.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the motions to suppress evidence obtained from wiretaps, finding that the necessity and probable cause requirements were met. The court also denied Belton's motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search, applying the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court found probable cause based on the suspicious circumstances and modifications observed on the vehicle. The district court also denied the motion to recuse, stating that a judge's authorization of wiretap warrants does not require recusal from subsequent motions to suppress.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decisions, holding that the wiretap affidavits met the necessity and probable cause requirements, the vehicle search was justified under the automobile exception, and the denial of the motion to recuse was not an abuse of discretion. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Elmer's conviction and upheld the sentences of Derek, Whitney, and Elmer, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing decisions.

United States v. Mims

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3009

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Ralph Erickson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A grand jury indicted Derek Mims, Elmer Mims, David Belton, and Anton Whitney for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Whitney was also charged with possession of a firearm by a drug user, and Belton with possession of a firearm by a felon and drug user. Derek, Belton, and Whitney entered conditional guilty pleas, while a jury found Elmer guilty. The defendants appealed the district court's denial of motions to suppress evidence from wiretaps and a vehicle search, and the denial of a motion to recuse. Elmer also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and the length of his sentence, while Derek and Whitney challenged their sentences.

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa denied the motions to suppress evidence obtained from wiretaps, finding that the necessity and probable cause requirements were met. The court also denied Belton's motion to suppress evidence from a vehicle search, applying the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. The court found probable cause based on the suspicious circumstances and modifications to the vehicle. The motion to recuse was denied, as the judge's authorization of wiretaps did not require recusal.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's denial of the motions to suppress, finding no clear error in the necessity and probable cause determinations. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to recuse, citing precedent that a judge's authorization of wiretaps does not necessitate recusal. The court found sufficient evidence to support Elmer's conviction and upheld the sentences of Derek, Whitney, and Elmer, finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's sentencing decisions. The judgments of the district court were affirmed.

United States v. Wiley

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Docket: 23-3342

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: William D. Benton

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Drugs & Biotech, Health Law

Kathan Daniel Wiley was convicted of conspiracy to distribute fentanyl and possession with intent to distribute fentanyl resulting in serious bodily injury. On October 30, 2021, Wiley's 18-month-old child ingested fentanyl pills, leading to severe health issues but ultimately surviving. Wiley had been distributing fentanyl pills for months, and evidence showed he obtained the pills shortly before the incident. The jury found him guilty on both counts, and the district court sentenced him to 240 months for the conspiracy charge and 324 months for possession with intent to distribute, to be served concurrently.

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied Wiley's motion for judgment of acquittal. Wiley appealed, arguing insufficient evidence for the conspiracy charge, claiming his possession was to support his addiction rather than for distribution. He also contended that the evidence did not support the conviction for possession with intent to distribute resulting in serious bodily injury, asserting the fentanyl ingested by his child was intended for personal use.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, affirming the district court's decision. The court held that the evidence, including Facebook messages and testimony, supported the jury's finding of a conspiracy and intent to distribute. The court also upheld the district court's application of a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(13) for misrepresenting the substance as another drug. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, affirming the 324-month sentence as substantively reasonable. The judgment was affirmed.

M.H., et al. v. Omegle.com LLC

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-10338

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Per Curiam

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Communications Law, Criminal Law, Internet Law

C.H., an eleven-year-old, was sexually exploited by a stranger on Omegle.com, an online platform that connects users in video chatrooms. The stranger, referred to as John Doe, threatened C.H. into creating child pornography. C.H.'s parents sued Omegle.com LLC, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (Masha’s Law) for knowingly possessing child pornography and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act for knowingly benefiting from a sex trafficking venture.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida dismissed the claims, citing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which protects providers of interactive computer services from being treated as the publisher or speaker of user-provided information. The court also found that the sex trafficking claim did not meet the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA) exception to section 230 because C.H.'s parents did not allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of benefiting from sex trafficking.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that C.H.'s parents did not state a claim under Masha’s Law because they failed to allege that Omegle.com knowingly possessed or accessed child pornography. The court also held that the FOSTA exception to section 230 requires actual knowledge of sex trafficking, not just constructive knowledge. Since C.H.'s parents did not plausibly allege that Omegle.com had actual knowledge of the sex trafficking incident involving C.H., the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims.

United States v. Armstrong

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 21-11252

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Barbara Lagoa

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John Armstrong, Jr. was indicted on multiple charges, including Hobbs Act robbery, bank robbery, attempted bank robbery, aiding and abetting bank robbery, and using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during these crimes. He pled guilty to several counts, and the government dismissed others. Armstrong was sentenced to 420 months in prison, including mandatory consecutive sentences for the firearm charges.

Armstrong appealed, arguing that his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) were invalid because the predicate offenses (bank robbery) could be committed without violence, making the "crime of violence" definition unconstitutionally vague. The district court rejected this argument, relying on Eleventh Circuit precedent that bank robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed Armstrong's convictions. However, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Taylor, which held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A), prompted the Supreme Court to vacate the Eleventh Circuit's decision and remand the case for reconsideration.

Upon reconsideration, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Armstrong's convictions. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is a divisible statute, criminalizing both bank robbery and bank extortion as separate offenses. Armstrong's convictions for bank robbery by intimidation were upheld as crimes of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The court also affirmed that aiding and abetting bank robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. Additionally, the court concluded that attempted bank robbery under § 2113(a) is a crime of violence because it requires an element of force, violence, or intimidation.

The Eleventh Circuit thus affirmed Armstrong's convictions for Counts 4, 10, and 12.

United States v. Simmons

Court: US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Docket: 22-12148

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Britt Grant

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

One night, Officer Devosie Jones of the City of Remerton Police Department attempted to stop a black Cadillac with one headlight. The car did not stop, leading to a high-speed chase that ended when the Cadillac crashed into a tree. Quinton Simmons was found trying to exit the car and was arrested. Officers found narcotics and a firearm in the vehicle. Simmons was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. He pleaded not guilty, claiming he was kidnapped and framed by a gang member who fled the scene.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia denied Simmons's Batson challenge, accepting the government's race-neutral reasons for striking three black jurors. During the trial, the court allowed the government to play a brief segment of a body camera video but denied Simmons's request to play additional clips during closing arguments, as they had not been shown during the evidence phase. The jury found Simmons guilty on all counts.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of closing arguments, as Simmons had the opportunity to present the video clips during the trial but chose not to. The court also found no error in the district court's denial of the Batson challenge, as Simmons failed to make a prima facie case of racial discrimination, and the government's race-neutral explanations were credible. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment.

United States v. Burwell

Court: US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

Docket: 16-3009

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Robert Leon Wilkins

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Bryan Burwell and Aaron Perkins were involved in a series of bank robberies and were convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, including mandatory minimum sentences for firearms-related convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which mandates enhanced penalties for using a firearm during a crime of violence. Burwell and Perkins argued that their convictions under § 924(c) were erroneous because federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is not categorically a crime of violence.

The District Court denied their post-conviction motions, which challenged the application of § 924(c) based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, which invalidated the residual clause of § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague. Burwell and Perkins appealed, arguing that bank robbery by extortion does not involve the use or threat of force and thus cannot be considered a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c).

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) is indivisible regarding the means of committing bank robbery—by force and violence, intimidation, or extortion. The court concluded that extortion, as a means of committing bank robbery, does not necessarily involve the use or threat of force. Therefore, bank robbery under § 2113(a) does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 924(c). Consequently, the court vacated Burwell's and Perkins's § 924(c) convictions and remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether to release them immediately.

In re Alabama Department of Corrections v. Booth

Court: Supreme Court of Alabama

Docket: SC-2024-0259

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Brad Mendheim

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Joshua Lashawn Booth was convicted in 2018 of three counts of possession of obscene material and sentenced to 15 years in prison. While incarcerated, Booth filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Bibb Circuit Court, claiming that the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) refused to grant him correctional incentive time. Booth argued that the statute barring sex offenders from receiving such time did not apply to his convictions. ADOC moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, but the Bibb Circuit Court denied the motion and ruled in favor of Booth, ordering ADOC to calculate his correctional incentive time.

ADOC appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals, arguing that Booth's filing should have been a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Montgomery Circuit Court, not a habeas corpus application in the Bibb Circuit Court. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed, reversed the Bibb Circuit Court's judgment, and directed the case to be transferred to the Montgomery Circuit Court.

The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case to determine if the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicted with Ex parte Culbreth and Ex parte Tanksley. The Supreme Court concluded that the issue was one of venue, not jurisdiction, and that ADOC had waived its objection to improper venue by not raising it in the Bibb Circuit Court. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was in conflict with the precedent that venue objections can be waived if not timely raised. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision and remanded the case for proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Post-Prison Transfer Board v. McGowan

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 181

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Cody Hiland

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law

In 1995, Grady McGowan was convicted of residential burglary. In 2020, he pleaded guilty to residential burglary again and was sentenced to nine years in prison with an additional eleven-year suspended sentence. His sentencing order noted that he might be ineligible for parole due to a prior felony conviction. The Arkansas Division of Correction initially determined McGowan was eligible for parole and provided him a parole hearing, but later rescinded this decision based on a 2022 opinion from the Arkansas Attorney General, which led to a recalculation of his parole-eligibility date.

McGowan filed a petition in the Pulaski County Circuit Court seeking declaratory judgment on his parole eligibility under Act 683 of 2023. The circuit court granted declaratory relief in favor of McGowan, finding that the sentencing order did not expressly designate his ineligibility for parole as required by the statute. The court ordered the appellants to modify his parole-eligibility date but denied further relief, stating that McGowan's release was an issue for the Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board.

The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that McGowan's sentencing order did not contain the express designation required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609(b)(2)(B) to render him ineligible for parole. The court also declined to remand the case for the sentencing order to be amended nunc pro tunc. The decision was consistent with the court's reasoning in a companion case, Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board.

Rodgers v. Arkansas Parole Board

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 176

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Karen R. Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Torry Rodgers entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere in 2018 to aggravated robbery, theft of property by threat of serious physical injury, and felon in possession of a firearm, for crimes committed in 2017. He was sentenced to concurrent twelve-year terms for each offense, with a notation on his sentencing order indicating he would serve 100% of his sentence for aggravated robbery. Rodgers had a prior conviction for residential burglary in 2008, which was later classified as a violent felony for parole purposes under a 2015 amendment.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Rodgers's petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and mandamus relief, and granted the cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by the Arkansas Parole Board and other appellees. The circuit court found that Act 683 of 2023, which amended parole eligibility calculations, did not apply to Rodgers, and that his sentencing order's notation was sufficient to designate that he was sentenced under the relevant statute.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the notation in Rodgers's sentencing order did not constitute an express designation to Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-93-609, as required by Act 683. The court found that the plain language of the statute was clear and unambiguous, and that Rodgers's prior residential burglary conviction should not be considered a violent felony for parole purposes. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

Wright v. Arkansas Post-Prison Transfer Board

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 Ark. 173

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Dan Kemp

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Perry Wright was convicted of residential burglary in 2006 and sentenced to three years' imprisonment with an additional seven years' suspended imposition of sentence. In 2020, he pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender to twelve years' imprisonment, with a notation on his sentencing order stating "DEFENDANT IS TO SERVE FLAT TIME." In 2023, Wright filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking to have his parole-eligibility date recalculated based on Act 683 of 2023, which he argued clarified that a pre-2015 residential-burglary conviction is not a felony involving violence for parole eligibility purposes unless explicitly stated in the sentencing order.

The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied Wright's petition for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and writ of mandamus, as well as his motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court granted the appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment, which included Wright's institutional file and plea colloquy from his 2020 plea hearing. The court found that Act 683 did not apply to Wright and did not apply retroactively, and it considered extrinsic evidence in reaching its conclusion.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and found that the circuit court erred in its findings. The court held that Act 683 does apply to Wright and should be applied retroactively. Additionally, the court determined that the circuit court improperly considered extrinsic evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

People v. Superior Court (Mitchell)

Court: Supreme Court of California

Docket: S281950

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Patricia Guerrero

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2018, Richard Allen Mitchell was charged with one felony count of resisting an executive officer and one misdemeanor count of possessing a controlled substance. The prosecution also alleged that Mitchell had a prior "strike" conviction. Five years later, just before the trial was to begin, the trial court reduced the felony charge to a misdemeanor and referred Mitchell to a veterans court program.

The Ventura County District Attorney sought review of the trial court's order by filing both an appeal and a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. The district attorney argued that the trial court lacked statutory authority to reduce the felony charge to a misdemeanor before sentencing. The Court of Appeal stayed the trial court proceedings and issued an order to show cause. After briefing, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court's order was unauthorized and granted the requested relief, determining that the order was appealable under certain statutory provisions.

The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and disagreed with the Court of Appeal's finding on appealability. The Supreme Court held that the trial court's order was not appealable under the cited statutory provisions because it did not set aside or terminate any portion of the action but merely modified the charges. However, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order was unauthorized and in excess of its jurisdiction, making it subject to writ review. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal but noted that the trial court's subsequent actions, taken while a temporary stay was in effect, were void. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion.

In re Nguyen

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B329158(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: November 27, 2024

Judge: Lee Edmon

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Tam Steven Nguyen committed various crimes at the age of 22 and was convicted in 2003 of attempted murder, kidnapping, and assault with a firearm. The jury also found true firearm allegations. He was sentenced to a determinate term of 14 years, an indeterminate term of 25 years to life, and a life term with the possibility of parole. While incarcerated, Nguyen earned various credits, including good conduct and educational merit credits. His minimum eligible parole date (MEPD) is set for February 2036, and his youth parole eligible date (YPED) is set for October 2026.

Nguyen petitioned the trial court for a writ of habeas corpus in 2022, arguing that he should be allowed to use all earned credits to advance his YPED, not just educational merit credit. The trial court denied his petition. Nguyen then petitioned the California Court of Appeal, which summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review, ordered the appellate court to vacate its order, and issue an order to show cause.

The California Court of Appeal reviewed the case and held that Nguyen's right to equal protection was not violated. The court found that youth and nonyouth offenders are not similarly situated for the purposes of the challenged regulations, as youth offenders have two parole eligibility dates (MEPD and YPED) while nonyouth offenders have only one (MEPD). The court also determined that there is a rational basis for the regulation, as it aligns with the legislative intent to provide youth offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release while maintaining a relatively fixed YPED. Consequently, the court denied Nguyen's petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Nunez-Dosangos v. Superior Ct.

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: A171177(First Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Carin Fujisaki

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Jose Nunez-Dosangos filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his ongoing detention in county jail pending trial on a charge of assault with a semiautomatic firearm. He was later released on his own recognizance after pleading guilty to a new charge of accessory after the fact, rendering his petition moot. However, the court decided to address the case due to its broad public interest and likelihood of recurrence. The petitioner had accrued presentence time-served and conduct credits exceeding the maximum potential sentence for the charged offense, and a probation report assessed him with a low risk of recidivism.

The Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco initially denied bail and set the case for a preliminary hearing. The magistrate judge found insufficient evidence to show the petitioner knew of his co-defendant's intent to use the firearm, leading to the dismissal of the murder charge against him. The People refiled the murder charge, which was again dismissed by the trial court. The petitioner filed multiple motions for release, arguing his prolonged detention violated due process, but the trial court denied these motions, citing public safety concerns and the possibility of refiling the murder charge.

The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and concluded that the petitioner's pretrial detention was excessive in relation to the government's public safety goals, constituting impermissible punishment in violation of due process principles. The court noted that the length of detention exceeded the maximum potential sentence and that the trial court erred in relying on the possibility of refiling the murder charge. The petition was ultimately dismissed as moot due to the petitioner's release.

People v. Armas

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: D082091(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Joan Irion

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Antonio German Armas was convicted of distributing and possessing child pornography. He was placed on two years of formal probation, set to expire on August 16, 2023. However, Armas violated the terms of his probation twice, leading to extensions of his probation, with the final expiration date set for June 9, 2024. Armas appealed the trial court's first order finding that he violated the terms of his probation.

The Superior Court of San Bernardino County found that Armas violated his probation terms and imposed a suspended sentence of two years and eight months, reinstating formal probation with a new expiration date of January 20, 2024. Armas's appeal from this order was initially rejected as untimely, but he filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was granted, allowing his appeal to proceed. Meanwhile, the trial court found another probation violation but reinstated probation instead of imposing the suspended sentence, extending the probation to June 9, 2024. Armas appealed this second order, which was affirmed by the appellate court.

The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. By the time of the review, Armas had completed his probation. The court held that the appeal was moot because Armas had already served his probation term, and any decision would have no practical effect. The court dismissed the appeal, noting that potential future consequences of the probation violation were too speculative to prevent a finding of mootness. The court relied on precedents that established that the completion of a probation term renders an appeal moot unless there are ongoing adverse collateral consequences, which were not present in this case.

People v. Gonzalez

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: H050752(Sixth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Charles E. Wilson II

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2013, Ulysses Gonzalez entered a no-contest plea to two charges of domestic violence against two different victims and admitted to an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury, as well as various prior convictions. He was sentenced to 15 years in state prison. Following the passage of Senate Bill 483, Gonzalez requested resentencing in 2022, arguing that his sentence should be reduced due to changes in the law. The trial court struck the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, reducing his sentence by one year but denied further reduction.

The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially sentenced Gonzalez to 15 years, including enhancements for prior convictions and great bodily injury. In 2022, Gonzalez sought resentencing under Senate Bill 483, which invalidated certain enhancements. The trial court struck one enhancement, reducing his sentence to 14 years but refused to reduce it further, citing aggravating factors and Gonzalez's conduct in prison.

The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in not applying the requirements of amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which mandates that aggravating factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated by the defendant. The appellate court held that the trial court improperly relied on unproven aggravating factors and failed to consider Gonzalez's childhood trauma as required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to apply the amended sentencing laws and consider all relevant factors.

People v. Hall

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: F087187(Fifth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Mark Wood Snauffer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Tiree Austin Jarmel Hall, who was convicted by a jury of one felony count of inflicting corporal punishment or injury on a child (minor T.E.), one misdemeanor count of child abuse as to a different child (minor A.F.), and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer. The trial court suspended the imposition of the sentence and placed Hall on probation with various terms and conditions. Hall appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the two non-testifying children to police officers at the scene, claiming these statements were inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington and Ohio v. Clark.

The Superior Court of Kings County initially found the children’s statements admissible under various hearsay exceptions and determined that the statements were not testimonial under Crawford. The court also found that Hall had forfeited his right to confront the witnesses by intentionally causing their unavailability, as evidenced by his actions and those of his domestic partner, Deanna English, who repeatedly refused to comply with subpoenas and made the children unavailable for trial.

The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and upheld the trial court’s rulings. The appellate court independently concluded that the children’s statements were not testimonial, as they were made during an ongoing emergency and were not intended to be used as trial testimony. Additionally, the court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that Hall had forfeited his confrontation rights by intentionally causing the children’s unavailability. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the children’s statements and rejecting Hall’s Sixth Amendment claims.

People v. Muhammad

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: B334294(Second Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Rashida A. Adams

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2018, Wendall Porter Muhammad pled no contest to attempted murder after stabbing Moses Sow during an altercation. Muhammad admitted to inflicting great bodily injury on Sow and using a deadly weapon, a knife. He was sentenced to nine years in prison. In January 2023, Muhammad filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that changes to sections 188 and 189 meant he could not be convicted of attempted murder under current law.

The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Muhammad's petition, concluding he failed to establish a prima facie case for relief. The court determined there was no possibility Muhammad was convicted on a theory of liability that was no longer valid, as he was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder.

The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the record of conviction conclusively established Muhammad was the sole and direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. The court noted that the preliminary hearing transcript and Muhammad's admissions during his plea supported this conclusion. Since the natural and probable consequences doctrine applies only to accomplices, and Muhammad acted alone, he was ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. The court also rejected Muhammad's procedural due process argument, stating that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record of conviction demonstrated his ineligibility for relief as a matter of law.

People v. Robinson

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: C098299M(Third Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Laurie M. Earl

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted by a grand jury for multiple criminal counts, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He pleaded no contest to the charges and received a 22-year prison sentence. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, arguing that the trial court erred in considering grand jury testimony. The People agreed that the grand jury testimony was inadmissible hearsay but disagreed on the proper remedy. The San Joaquin County District Attorney, as amicus curiae, argued that the grand jury transcripts were part of Robinson’s record of conviction and admissible under section 1172.6.

The Superior Court of San Joaquin County denied Robinson’s petition for resentencing, finding that the grand jury transcripts were admissible and that Robinson was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the grand jury testimony and that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) created a hearsay exception for evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial, including grand jury testimony. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and that the procedural safeguards in place ensured the reliability of the testimony. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did not apply to section 1172.6 hearings, as they are postconviction collateral proceedings. The court concluded that Robinson’s due process rights were not violated, as he had the opportunity to present new evidence and challenge the grand jury testimony at the evidentiary hearing.

People v. Vicencio

Court: California Courts of Appeal

Docket: E082997(Fourth Appellate District)

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Michael J. Raphael

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2011, a defendant was convicted in California of multiple sex offenses, including lewd acts on a minor and oral copulation with a child under ten. His sentence was enhanced due to a prior Michigan conviction for assault with intent to commit sexual penetration. Years later, he sought to have the enhancement removed under the new Penal Code section 1172.75, arguing that out-of-state convictions should not be considered sexually violent offenses under the new law. The trial court denied his request, concluding that the Michigan conviction was indeed a sexually violent offense, making him ineligible for relief.

The Superior Court of Riverside County initially sentenced the defendant to a determinate 15-year prison term, plus an indeterminate term of 30 years to life, including a one-year enhancement for the prior Michigan conviction. The judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2012. In 2023, the case was revisited to determine eligibility for recall and resentencing under section 1172.75. The defendant argued that his Michigan conviction did not disqualify him from relief, but the court disagreed, finding that out-of-state convictions could still be considered sexually violent offenses.

The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that out-of-state convictions could be considered sexually violent offenses if they included all the elements of the offenses listed in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b). The court found that the Michigan conviction met these criteria, and thus, the defendant was not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. The order denying relief was affirmed.

State v. Eric L.

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20834

Opinion Date: December 17, 2024

Judges: Andrew J. McDonald, Gregory D'Auria, Raheem L. Mullins, Steven D. Ecker, Joan K. Alexander, Nora Dannehy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with violating a protective order and was sentenced to five years of incarceration, execution suspended, followed by five years of probation. Later, he was arrested for threatening and subsequently charged with violating his probation. Due to COVID-19 related delays, the violation of probation arrest warrant was not served until several months after it was issued. The defendant remained in custody for several months before being released on bond. The trial court found the defendant in violation of his probation, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to five years of incarceration, execution suspended after six months, followed by three years and 250 days of probation.

The trial court declined the defendant's request to direct the commissioner of correction to apply specific presentence confinement credit to his sentence, stating that the determination of such credits was within the purview of the Department of Correction. The defendant appealed this decision to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment, relying on its decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lack authority to award presentence confinement credit under General Statutes § 18-98d.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court disagreed with the state's argument that the defendant was not entitled to credit starting from the date the arrest warrant was signed, noting that the defendant was not serving another sentence during that time. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment in part and remanded the case to the trial court to exercise its discretion in accordance with this opinion.

State v. Hurdle

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20827

Opinion Date: December 17, 2024

Judge: Joan K. Alexander

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree following a guilty plea. He appealed, claiming that the trial court incorrectly concluded it lacked authority to direct the commissioner of correction to apply presentence confinement credit to his sentence. The defendant also argued that his plea agreement included an understanding that he would receive such credit and that there was no meeting of the minds on this issue, rendering the plea agreement void.

The trial court had denied the defendant’s request for presentence confinement credit, stating it had no discretion under the statute to grant it. The court also denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, finding no reason to believe he did not understand the terms of the plea agreement. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to award presentence confinement credit and that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for such credit.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court does have discretionary authority under the statute to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement dates to a sentence. The court found that the legislative history and statutory text support the trial court’s inherent authority to issue such orders. The court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment regarding the trial court’s authority to order presentence confinement credit and remanded the case for the trial court to exercise its discretion on this issue.

The Supreme Court also agreed with the Appellate Court that the plea agreement did not include an agreement for presentence confinement credit and that the defendant’s subjective belief that he would receive such credit was unreasonable. The court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment in all other respects.

State v. Nixon

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Docket: SC20848

Opinion Date: December 17, 2024

Judges: Andrew J. McDonald, Gregory D'Auria, Raheem L. Mullins, Steven D. Ecker, Joan K. Alexander, Nora Dannehy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant was charged with multiple offenses related to a series of robberies and burglaries in 2020. He was incarcerated following his arrest in October 2020. During pretrial proceedings, the defendant reached a plea agreement with the state, which included a total effective sentence of ten years of imprisonment followed by five years of special parole. The sentences were to run concurrently and be stayed until April 1, 2022, to ensure that the defendant's pretrial credit was not affected.

The defendant pleaded guilty in multiple judicial districts, and the courts issued sentences in accordance with the plea agreement. However, the defendant later filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that he was promised 521 days of presentence confinement credit, but the commissioner of correction applied fewer days, resulting in a longer effective sentence.

The trial court in the judicial district of New Britain dismissed the defendant's motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Appellate Court's decision in State v. Hurdle, which held that trial courts lacked authority under General Statutes § 18-98d to award presentence confinement credit.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that trial courts do have the authority to direct the commissioner to apply specific presentence confinement credit to a sentence on a judgment mittimus, as established in the companion case of State v. Hurdle. The court also determined that the defendant's motion raised a colorable claim that the plea agreement required the application of 521 days of presentence confinement credit and that there was no indication the defendant waived his statutory right to this credit.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings to consider the merits of the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Hayes v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1354

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Michael P. Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jarrod James Hayes was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Zedekiah Jones. Hayes argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress three firearms found at his home, which he disclosed without receiving Miranda warnings. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, improper admission of a witness's video statement, refusal to bifurcate charges, and failure to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and mutual combat.

A Douglas County grand jury indicted Hayes on multiple charges, including malice murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The marijuana possession charge was dropped, and Hayes was found guilty on all remaining charges. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for malice murder and additional concurrent terms for the weapons charges. Hayes's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the firearms were admissible because Hayes's statement about their location was voluntary, despite the lack of Miranda warnings. The court also found no merit in Hayes's other claims. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the witness's prior inconsistent statement, denying the motion to bifurcate charges, or refusing to give jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and mutual combat. The court also determined that any errors by trial counsel did not result in prejudice sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial's outcome. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Hayes's convictions and sentences.

Jiles v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1113

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Carla W. McMillian

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kaylon Janard Jiles was found guilty of felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Eris Fisher. Fisher and his associate, Laura Griffin, had been buying and selling cocaine together. Fisher contacted Jiles to purchase cocaine, but after receiving it, Fisher complained that the weight was off. Jiles agreed to deliver more cocaine to Fisher. When Fisher arrived at the motel parking lot to meet Jiles, Jiles and two other men approached and shot Fisher. Fisher's wife, Maryanne Crawford, and Griffin witnessed the shooting. Crawford initially lied to officers about the motive for the shooting, and Griffin disposed of a gun found near Fisher's body.

The DeKalb County grand jury indicted Jiles and Traquan McLeod for multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. McLeod pleaded guilty to reduced charges, while Jiles went to trial. The jury acquitted Jiles of malice murder and gang activity but found him guilty of felony murder and other charges. The trial court sentenced Jiles to life in prison without parole. Jiles filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, leading to this appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Jiles argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on accomplice corroboration and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court found no plain error in the jury instructions and determined that Jiles's counsel's performance was not deficient. The court also found that any presumed errors did not likely affect the trial's outcome. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Jiles's convictions, concluding that the cumulative prejudice from the alleged errors did not warrant a new trial.

Mills v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1021

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Michael P. Boggs

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In December 2017, Roger Tashawn Mills was involved in the shooting death of Masuto Garrett. Mills and his co-defendant, Mosas Bolar, were indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. Mills was initially convicted on all counts, but his convictions were reversed on appeal due to the improper removal of a juror. Mills was retried and found guilty of felony murder and other related charges. He was sentenced to life without parole plus an additional five years for firearm possession.

During the retrial, the jury found Mills guilty of several charges, including felony murder and aggravated assault, but acquitted him on others. Mills filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, leading to the current appeal. Mills argued that the evidence was insufficient to disprove his justification defense and that the trial court erred in admitting other-acts evidence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to support Mills' convictions. The court found that the jury was entitled to reject Mills' justification defense based on the evidence presented, including witness testimony and forensic analysis. The court also held that the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting other-acts evidence, as it was relevant to show Mills' motive and gang affiliation, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Mills' convictions, concluding that the State had met its burden of disproving Mills' justification defense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings.

Scott v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1125

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: John Ellington

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Lewarner Jaron Scott was convicted of murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Kevin Compton. The incident occurred on July 12, 2014, at a nightclub in Kennesaw, Georgia. A bottle was thrown, injuring Scott’s friend, Jawaree Hill, which led to an altercation. Compton, along with his friends Brandon McMurtry and McKinley Bain, decided to leave the club. As they were driving out of the parking lot, gunshots were fired, and Compton was fatally shot in the head. Witnesses identified a man with dreadlocks and a blue shirt carrying a gun before and after the shooting. Scott was later identified as the man seen with the gun and driving a gray Dodge Neon.

A Cobb County grand jury indicted Scott on multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. In August 2015, a jury found Scott guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison plus additional consecutive sentences for other charges. Scott’s trial counsel filed a motion for a new trial, which was later amended by his post-conviction counsel. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial in August 2023, and Scott’s counsel filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Scott’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that the jury was authorized to reject alternative hypotheses presented by Scott and found that the circumstantial evidence, including witness testimonies and forensic evidence linking the spent casings to Scott’s gun, supported the verdict. The court affirmed the judgment, upholding Scott’s convictions and sentences.

Sharkey v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1096

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Verda Colvin

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

John Deangelo Sharkey was convicted of malice murder and armed robbery in connection with the shooting death of Dominique Barker. The crimes occurred on December 6, 2017. Sharkey was indicted by a Clayton County grand jury on February 8, 2018, and a jury trial was held from January 13 to 16, 2020. The jury found Sharkey guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus 20 years consecutive for armed robbery. Sharkey filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.

Sharkey appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the exclusion of a video recording showing a four-year-old child identifying another man in a photo lineup, and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to admit the video under the child-hearsay statute. The trial court had excluded the video, and Sharkey argued that his counsel was ineffective for not taking steps to admit it.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was more than sufficient to support Sharkey's convictions. The court noted that the evidence against Sharkey was strong, including eyewitness identifications and the presence of his cell phone at the crime scene. The court also held that any error in excluding the video recording was harmless and that any deficient performance by trial counsel was nonprejudicial. The court affirmed Sharkey's convictions, concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the video had been admitted.

Sumrall v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1368

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Shawn Ellen LaGrua

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Ammon Sumrall was convicted in October 1992 by a DeKalb County jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes related to the shooting death of Wade Barrett, Jr. on April 7, 1991. He was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences plus five additional years. Over 30 years later, Sumrall filed a pro se petition in the Superior Court of DeKalb County seeking retroactive first-offender treatment based on an amendment to OCGA § 42-8-66. He also filed a motion to declare the statute unconstitutional.

The trial court initially dismissed Sumrall’s petition and motion, but later vacated this order and issued an amended order. The amended order dismissed the petition for failing to obtain the necessary consent from the prosecuting attorney and denied the motion to declare the statute unconstitutional, citing a lack of standing and insufficient supporting arguments.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decisions. The court held that Sumrall failed to meet the statutory requirement of obtaining the prosecuting attorney’s consent before filing his petition for retroactive first-offender treatment. The court also found no merit in Sumrall’s argument that the prosecuting attorney’s inaction constituted implied consent. Additionally, the court upheld the trial court’s denial of Sumrall’s motion to declare OCGA § 42-8-66 (a) (1) unconstitutional, concluding that Sumrall did not demonstrate a clear and palpable conflict with the Georgia or United States Constitutions. The court emphasized that the statute did not deprive Sumrall of his right to access the courts or to be heard.

Troutman v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1163

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Nels Peterson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Andrew Troutman was convicted of malice murder for the stabbing death of Earl Clemons. The incident occurred in January 2014, and Troutman was indicted on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault. The case involved a pre-trial appeal where the trial court's decision to suppress a statement made by Troutman to the police was partially affirmed and partially reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia. At trial in August 2019, the jury found Troutman guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Troutman filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied, leading to this appeal.

The trial court's decision was based on evidence including threats made by Troutman against Clemons, Troutman's presence at the crime scene, and his confessions to his uncle and former girlfriend. The jury also heard about a fake DeVry student ID found in Troutman's room and his inconsistent statements to the police. The trial court's suppression of part of Troutman's confession did not affect the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found the evidence constitutionally sufficient to support the conviction. The court held that OCGA § 24-14-6, which pertains to circumstantial evidence, did not apply because there was direct evidence of Troutman's guilt. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct were either not preserved for review or resolved in Troutman's favor. The court also found that Troutman did not prove prejudice from his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including the decision to present an alibi defense and the failure to object to certain prosecutorial comments during closing arguments.

The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that Troutman did not demonstrate that any alleged errors by his trial counsel affected the outcome of the trial.

Weston v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1069

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Charlie Bethel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Adrian Darnyell Weston was convicted of malice murder for the shooting death of Alex Tolbert. The incident occurred on January 23, 2021, at a hotel in Madison, where Tolbert was found shot 11 times. Investigators collected fourteen .22-caliber shell casings and three bullets from the scene. Weston was identified as a person of interest due to a history of conflict with Tolbert, including a stabbing incident in 2019. On the day of the murder, Weston was overheard saying he would kill Tolbert and was seen leaving with a gun. Shell casings from the crime scene matched those found at a residence where Weston stayed. Weston fled the state and was later arrested in Kansas.

A Morgan County grand jury indicted Weston for malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in March 2021. In November 2022, a jury found Weston guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole for malice murder, with the other counts merging or being vacated. Weston filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court in April 2024. He then filed a timely notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court held that the evidence, though circumstantial, was sufficient to support the conviction under Georgia law. The court noted that the jury is responsible for resolving evidentiary conflicts and assessing witness credibility. The court also found that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Weston’s motion for a new trial on the general grounds, as it had considered the evidence, witness credibility, and the weight of the evidence. The court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than Weston’s guilt.

Wood v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia

Docket: S24A1063

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Andrew Pinson

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

Tabitha Wood was convicted of malice murder and other crimes after killing her fiancé, Leroy Kramer. Wood claimed self-defense, citing a history of Kramer’s violence towards her and presented expert testimony that she suffered from battered person syndrome. Kramer’s body was found in their shared home two months after his death, and Wood was indicted on multiple charges, including malice murder and concealing the death of another. The jury found her guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, with additional sentences for other charges.

Wood appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not allowing her to introduce testimony about Kramer’s violence towards other women under OCGA § 24-4-405 (b) and that this exclusion violated her constitutional right to a complete defense. The trial court had ruled that Wood could testify about her knowledge of Kramer’s violent acts to show her state of mind but could not introduce extrinsic evidence of specific acts through other witnesses. Wood’s motion for a new trial was denied, and she appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia.

The Supreme Court of Georgia held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony about Kramer’s prior acts of violence under Rule 405 (b), as a victim’s violent character is not an essential element of self-defense. The court also found no plain error in the trial court’s application of the evidentiary rules, concluding that Wood’s constitutional rights were not violated. The court affirmed Wood’s convictions.

State v. Al Muthafar

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 49435

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The defendant, Jameel Fakhri Al Muthafar, was convicted of aggravated assault and attempted strangulation. The case arose when K.S., the victim, called the police from a Rite Aid store in Boise, Idaho, expressing suicidal thoughts and claiming she had been attacked by her romantic partner, Al Muthafar. K.S. was taken to St. Alphonsus Hospital, where she was diagnosed with injuries from an alleged assault. She was then referred to FACES for a forensic examination, during which she described the assault and identified Al Muthafar as the perpetrator.

At the preliminary hearing, the magistrate court admitted hearsay statements made by K.S. to a nurse during the FACES examination, over Al Muthafar’s objection. The magistrate court found probable cause to bind the case over to the district court. Al Muthafar filed a motion to dismiss the Information, arguing that the hearsay statements were inadmissible and that without them, there was insufficient probable cause. The district court denied the motion, and the case proceeded to trial, where Al Muthafar was found guilty by a jury.

The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and determined that the magistrate court erred in admitting the hearsay statements at the preliminary hearing, as the State failed to establish that the statements were made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment. However, the court held that this error was harmless because Al Muthafar received a fair trial, where the jury found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based on properly admitted evidence.

Additionally, the court reviewed Al Muthafar’s sentence of fifteen years with five years fixed and found no abuse of discretion by the district court. The sentence was deemed reasonable given the severity of the charges, the defendant’s risk of future violence, and his lack of remorse. The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed both the conviction and the sentence.

State v. Eaton

Court: Idaho Supreme Court - Criminal

Docket: 51402

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Gregory W. Moeller

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The State of Idaho charged Lea Anne Eaton with felony burglary and petit theft after she used discarded Walmart receipts to return stolen items for a refund. Shortly after her arrest, a new statute creating the misdemeanor offense of commercial burglary became effective. Eaton sought to reduce her felony charge to a misdemeanor under the new statute, but the district court denied her motion. Eaton entered a conditional guilty plea to felony burglary, reserving her right to appeal the denied motion. The district court sentenced her to a unified ten-year sentence with four years fixed. Eaton's subsequent motions to reconsider the denial and to correct an illegal sentence were also denied.

The Idaho Court of Appeals upheld Eaton’s conviction and sentence. Eaton then petitioned for review by the Idaho Supreme Court, which granted the petition.

The Idaho Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court erred in denying Eaton’s motion to reduce her charge and her motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Court held that the commercial burglary statute was not retroactive and did not apply to Eaton’s conduct, as there was no clear legislative intent for retroactivity. The Court also determined that the commercial burglary statute created a new offense with distinct elements from the general burglary statute, and thus, Eaton was properly charged under the existing felony burglary statute. Consequently, Eaton was not entitled to the lesser penalty of the commercial burglary statute, and her sentence under the felony burglary statute was not illegal.

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction and the denial of Eaton’s Rule 35(a) motion.

Corcoran v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Docket: 24S-SD-00222

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Derek Molter

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

Joseph Corcoran was convicted of four murders by an Allen County jury, and the judge sentenced him to death as recommended by the jury. Corcoran has been involved in extensive litigation over the past 25 years, including multiple decisions from the Indiana Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, regarding the constitutionality of his execution. Corcoran has expressed his desire to accept his conviction and sentence, stating that he does not wish to pursue further legal challenges.

The Allen Superior Court initially sentenced Corcoran to death, and the Indiana Supreme Court remanded for resentencing due to the consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors. Upon resentencing, the death sentence was reimposed and affirmed by the Indiana Supreme Court. Corcoran chose not to pursue post-conviction relief, leading to competency proceedings initiated by the State Public Defender, who argued that Corcoran was incompetent to waive post-conviction remedies. The trial court and the Indiana Supreme Court found Corcoran competent. Corcoran later filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, which was dismissed.

The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and denied the State Public Defender's motions to file successive petitions for post-conviction relief and to stay the execution. The court held that Corcoran is competent to waive post-conviction remedies and that the State Public Defender lacks standing to file the petitions without Corcoran's authorization. Additionally, the court found no reasonable possibility that Corcoran is entitled to relief, as the claims presented were procedurally defaulted and previously addressed. The court concluded that Corcoran has a rational understanding of his execution and the reasons for it, and thus, denied the motions for a stay of execution.

State v. Mumford

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Docket: 23-1075

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Christopher McDonald

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

A police officer initiated a traffic stop of Ashlee Mumford because the vehicle's license plate was obscured by dirt and grime. During the stop, a drug detection dog conducted a sniff around the vehicle, briefly touching the passenger door and momentarily breaking the plane of the passenger window. The dog alerted to the presence of controlled substances, leading to a search that uncovered methamphetamine in the glove compartment and marijuana and a methamphetamine pipe in Mumford's purse. Mumford was arrested and charged with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. She was acquitted of methamphetamine possession but convicted of marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession.

In the Iowa District Court for Madison County, Mumford moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing it violated her constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court denied her motion, concluding the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and the use of the drug detection dog did not violate the Federal or State Constitution. Mumford was convicted of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia following a bench trial.

The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause due to the obscured license plate, and the use of the drug detection dog did not constitute an unlawful search. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Mumford's conviction for possession of marijuana, rejecting her argument that lab testing was required to prove the substance was marijuana. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying Mumford's motion to suppress evidence or her motion in arrest of judgment.

Commonwealth v. Torres

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court

Docket: SJC-13556

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Immigration Law

In 1999, the defendant admitted to sufficient facts to support a finding of guilty for distributing a class A substance. He later sought to withdraw this admission, claiming his plea counsel failed to inform him that it would lead to mandatory deportation. The defendant, a legal permanent resident since 1994, argued that he would have insisted on going to trial had he known the immigration consequences, citing his strong ties to the United States, including his American citizen wife and children, and his consistent employment as a welder.

The defendant's initial motion for a new trial was denied due to the absence of an affidavit from his plea counsel. He then filed a renewed motion with the necessary affidavit, which was also denied by a District Court judge after a non-evidentiary hearing. The judge concluded that while the plea counsel was ineffective, the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The Appeals Court affirmed this decision.

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case, focusing on whether the defendant established prejudice from his counsel's ineffectiveness. The court found that the motion judge improperly assessed the defendant's claim by not applying the reasonable person standard and by making credibility determinations about the defendant's assertion that he would have gone to trial. The court vacated the denial of the renewed motion and remanded the case for further findings on whether the defendant's ties to the United States constituted special circumstances and whether a reasonable person in his situation would have chosen to go to trial if properly advised.

Corrothers v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-CA-00401-SCT

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Jimmy Maxwell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Caleb Corrothers was convicted of two counts of capital murder and one count of aggravated assault after attacking Tonya Clark’s family, resulting in the deaths of her husband and son. The jury sentenced him to death for the murders and life for the assault. Corrothers appealed, but the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed his convictions and sentences.

Corrothers then sought post-conviction relief, raising multiple issues. The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied all but one claim, which alleged that a female juror had improperly communicated with Clark during the trial. The court granted a hearing on this juror-bias claim. Six years later, an evidentiary hearing was held where Corrothers presented two witnesses, his mother and cousin, who testified they saw the juror mouth “we got it” to Clark. The trial judge found these witnesses not credible due to their personal interest in the case and denied post-conviction relief.

Corrothers appealed this decision, arguing that the trial judge improperly disregarded his witnesses' testimony and that his right to compulsory process was denied. The Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the trial judge did not exclude the testimony but rather found it not credible, a determination to which the court must defer. The court also held that the procedural framework established in Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co. applied to Corrothers’s juror-bias claim, and the trial judge did not err in denying additional juror interviews.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s denial of Corrothers’s post-conviction relief, concluding that Corrothers failed to present credible evidence of juror bias.

Mitchell v. State

Court: Supreme Court of Mississippi

Citation: 2023-KA-00859-SCT

Opinion Date: December 5, 2024

Judge: Dawn H. Beam

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Holly Mitchell was found guilty of second-degree murder and possession of methamphetamine after she shot and killed her husband, Shawn Mitchell, in their home while holding their three-year-old daughter. Holly claimed she acted in self-defense because Shawn was violent and had been using meth. Witnesses testified about the couple's tumultuous relationship, marked by drug use and domestic violence. Holly's defense argued the shooting was accidental, while the prosecution presented evidence of premeditation.

The Marion County Circuit Court jury convicted Holly of second-degree murder. During deliberations, the jury expressed confusion about the instructions regarding second-degree murder and manslaughter. The trial court provided clarifications, but Holly's defense did not object to the court's responses. Holly appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were confusing and that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting additional instructions on imperfect-self-defense and culpable-negligence manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and found no reversible error in the jury instructions, stating they were clear and properly guided the jury's deliberations. The court also noted that the jury ultimately reached a unanimous decision. Regarding the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court determined that the issue was best addressed in a post-conviction proceeding due to the lack of a fully developed record on direct appeal.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed Holly's conviction for second-degree murder, dismissing her ineffective assistance of counsel claim without prejudice, allowing her to raise it in a post-conviction proceeding if she chooses.

State v. Seyler

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 300

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Beth Baker

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Dustin Lee Seyler was arrested on January 27, 2022, for two counts of burglary and was held without a warrant. The Justice Court held an initial appearance the next day and set a preliminary hearing for February 7, 2022, with bail set at $100,000. Seyler's counsel filed a notice of appearance and a request for discovery on February 1, 2022. The State filed a motion for leave to file an information on February 3, 2022, which the District Court granted on February 10, 2022. Seyler filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the thirteen-day delay between his initial appearance and the District Court's grant of leave was unreasonable. The District Court denied the motion, and Seyler pleaded guilty while reserving his right to appeal. At sentencing, the District Court imposed various fees, which Seyler contested.

The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied Seyler's motion to dismiss, finding the thirteen-day delay reasonable. Seyler appealed, arguing that the delay violated § 46-10-105, MCA, and that the District Court erred in imposing certain fees not mentioned in the oral pronouncement of his sentence.

The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Seyler's motion to dismiss. The Court found that the delay was not unreasonable given the circumstances and that Seyler had not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from the delay. However, the Court agreed with Seyler that the $50 pre-sentence investigation fee and the $200 cost of prosecution fee included in the written judgment conflicted with the oral pronouncement of his sentence. The Court affirmed Seyler's conviction but reversed and remanded for the District Court to amend the judgment by striking these fees.

State v. Villalobos

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 MT 301

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Ingrid Gayle Gustafson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Pablo Villalobos was arrested during a traffic stop for having two outstanding warrants and an expired license. During the arrest, he was found with a glass meth pipe, which he attempted to destroy. The residue on the pipe was confirmed to be methamphetamine. Villalobos initially entered a plea agreement to plead guilty to criminal possession of dangerous drugs in exchange for the dismissal of other charges and participation in a treatment court program. However, he was not accepted into the program due to his behavior, leading him to withdraw his plea and go to trial, where a jury found him guilty on all counts.

The Seventh Judicial District Court sentenced Villalobos to three years at the Department of Corrections (DOC) for the drug possession charge, with a requirement to enroll in the treatment court. He was also sentenced to two years, all suspended, for tampering with evidence, with treatment court completion as a condition of the suspended sentence. For the misdemeanor charges, the court initially sentenced him to 30 days in jail, suspended for one year, but later changed this to six months in the written judgment.

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court's requirement for Villalobos to complete the treatment court program as part of his DOC sentence was illegal, as the court can only recommend such placement. However, it upheld the requirement to complete the treatment court as a condition of the suspended sentence, provided Villalobos makes a good faith effort to qualify. The court also found the one-year suspension of the misdemeanor sentences exceeded the statutory maximum and reversed this part of the sentence, remanding for correction to align with the original 30-day sentence, suspended for no more than six months.

State v. Kilmer

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 318 Neb. 148

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: John Freudenberg

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Kevin T. Kilmer was charged with first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony after allegedly killing Ruth Ann Wittmuss with an ax. Kilmer had been staying with Wittmuss and Michael Malone in a trailer house in Kilgore, Nebraska. On the night of the murder, Kilmer arrived at a friend's house covered in blood and admitted to hitting Wittmuss with an ax. Law enforcement found Wittmuss' body in a suitcase on the side of a road, and an autopsy confirmed she died from blunt force trauma to the head. Evidence collected from the crime scene, including blood and DNA, linked Kilmer to the murder.

The Cherry County District Court jury found Kilmer guilty of both charges. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder and an additional 10 to 14 years for the use of a deadly weapon, with the sentences to be served consecutively. Kilmer appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to prove he acted with deliberate and premeditated malice.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The court noted that intent and premeditation can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's actions and the circumstances surrounding the incident. The court found that the evidence, including Kilmer's motive, the nature of Wittmuss' injuries, and Kilmer's actions before and after the murder, supported the jury's finding of deliberate and premeditated malice.

The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Kilmer's convictions and sentences, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

State v. Rivera-Meister

Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Citation: 318 Neb. 164

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: Stephanie Stacy

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The case involves Ryan D. Rivera-Meister, who was charged with attempted intentional child abuse resulting in death after the 16-month-old child of his girlfriend was fatally injured while in his care. Rivera-Meister initially claimed the child fell from a bunk bed, but medical evidence suggested the injuries were inconsistent with such a fall. He was charged in 2017, fled to Guatemala, and was extradited back to Nebraska in 2022. He pleaded no contest to the amended charge and was sentenced to 40 to 50 years in prison.

The Hall County District Court sentenced Rivera-Meister and credited him with 706 days for time served in Nebraska but denied his request for an additional 266 days for time spent in custody in Guatemala awaiting extradition. The court reasoned that his decision to flee and not return voluntarily justified denying the additional credit.

The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with Rivera-Meister and the State that he was entitled to the additional 266 days of credit for time served in Guatemala. The court held that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,106(1), an offender is entitled to credit for time spent in custody as a result of the charge for which the prison sentence is imposed, regardless of whether that custody was in another state or country. The court modified the sentence to include the additional 266 days, totaling 972 days of credit for time served. The court found no abuse of discretion in the length of the sentence imposed and affirmed the sentence as modified.

Reese v. Davis

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5755

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Michael P. Donnelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Thomas Reese, the petitioner, sought a writ of habeas corpus for his release from Trumbull Correctional Institution, arguing that he had completed his sentence. Reese was convicted in 2002 on multiple charges, including felonious assault and attempted murder, and was sentenced to a total of 25 years in prison. However, the sentencing entry contained errors, including an incorrect calculation of the total sentence and the improper merging of counts.

Reese did not raise these sentencing issues in his direct appeal, which focused solely on the trial court's alleged failure to comply with statutory requirements before accepting his jury trial waiver. The court of appeals reversed his convictions, but the Supreme Court of Ohio reinstated them. In 2023, Reese attempted to correct the sentencing entry through a motion, which was denied by the trial court. The court of appeals affirmed the denial, acknowledging the errors but stating they were voidable and could have been addressed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept Reese's jurisdictional appeal.

Reese filed for habeas corpus in 2024, arguing that his sentence should be calculated as 23 years, considering the errors in the sentencing entry and his jail-time credit. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with Reese, noting that the sentencing entry indicated a 23-year sentence, and Reese had served this time. The court found that Reese was entitled to immediate release, rejecting the warden's arguments that the claim was barred by res judicata and that sentencing errors were not jurisdictional. The court granted the writ of habeas corpus, ordering Reese's release.

State v. Beatty

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5684

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Michael P. Donnelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

A defendant was tried for shooting at a group of four people and was found guilty by a jury of four counts of felonious assault, each with a firearm specification, one count of discharging a firearm on or near prohibited premises with a firearm specification, and one count of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle. The trial court imposed three-year prison terms for each of the four firearm specifications attached to the felonious assault charges, with two terms being mandatory and two discretionary. All four terms were ordered to be served consecutively, resulting in a total of 12 years for the firearm specifications. Additional prison terms for the underlying offenses were ordered to be served concurrently, leading to an aggregate prison term of 16 to 18 years.

The defendant appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, arguing that only two of the four firearm specification prison terms should run consecutively. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, interpreting the relevant statutes to require consecutive service of all four prison terms for the firearm specifications.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and determined that the trial court erred in running the two discretionary prison terms for the firearm specifications consecutively. The court held that under R.C. 2929.41(A) and 2929.14(C)(1), only mandatory prison terms for firearm specifications must be served consecutively, while discretionary terms must be served concurrently unless an exception applies. The court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to amend the sentence to run the two discretionary prison terms concurrently with each other and with the other prison terms imposed.

State v. Dunn

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5742

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Jennifer L. Brunner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Juvenile Law

Niquan M. Dunn was indicted on six counts in the Geauga County Common Pleas Court, including drug-related crimes and possession of criminal tools. Counts 2 and 4, relevant to this appeal, charged Dunn with aggravated trafficking in drugs and trafficking in cocaine, respectively, with enhancements for committing the crimes "in the vicinity of a juvenile." The case proceeded to trial, where the State presented evidence including testimony from detectives and a controlled buy operation. Drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in a house where Dunn was staying, and a four-month-old child was present in the home.

The trial court denied Dunn's motion for acquittal on Counts 1 through 5 and the jury found him guilty on those counts. Dunn was sentenced to a total of 36 months in prison. On appeal, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals reversed the convictions in part, finding insufficient evidence that Dunn committed the crimes in the vicinity of a juvenile, as required for the enhancement. The appellate court focused on the lack of direct evidence that the child was present during the drug activities and distinguished the case from prior decisions.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the evidence was sufficient to support the "in the vicinity of a juvenile" enhancement. The court emphasized that circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that the child was present when Dunn prepared the drugs for distribution. The court reversed the Eleventh District's judgment, reinstating the enhancement on Count 2.

State v. Grad

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5710

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Jennifer L. Brunner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2014, a father was convicted of felonious assault and child endangering after his infant son was found with 26 bone fractures. The state’s case relied heavily on a medical expert who used a process-of-elimination methodology to conclude that the father intentionally caused the injuries, as no nontraumatic medical cause was identified. The expert made several assertions about medical principles, including the impact of Vitamin D on bone health, which were used to rebut the father's defense.

The trial court denied the father's motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial without holding a hearing. The Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, noting that the expert opinions presented by the father were known at the time of the trial and that the new studies merely confirmed existing theories.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and focused on whether the new scientific studies presented by the father constituted newly discovered evidence under Crim.R. 33(A)(6). The court noted that significant changes in scientific understanding could qualify as newly discovered evidence, even if based on theories known at the time of the trial. The court emphasized that new scientific evidence must provide a significantly stronger argument for the defense to warrant a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the trial court abused its discretion by not holding a hearing on the father's motion for leave. The court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case to the trial court to hold a hearing on the motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial.

State v. Hickman

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5747

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Jennifer L. Brunner

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 1980, Delmar Hickman was arrested for the murder of his parents and later pled not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to a mental-health facility and has been continuously hospitalized since then. Recently, the managing officer of his current facility recommended that Hickman be granted conditional release to a nonsecured group home. The Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas disapproved this recommendation.

The Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Hickman appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing that a trial court has no discretion to deny a change in commitment in the absence of clear and convincing evidence indicating that the level change should not be granted.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that under R.C. 2945.401, a trial court must use its discretion to approve, disapprove, or modify a recommendation for a change to nonsecured status or termination of commitment after considering all relevant factors, including those listed in R.C. 2945.401(E)(1) through (6). The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disapproving the recommendation for Hickman’s conditional release, given his history of severe violence and the potential threat to public safety if he were released to a nonsecured environment. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.

State v. Kennedy

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5728

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Melody Stewart

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Chelsie Kennedy pled guilty to robbery charges in three different cases in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. She received an aggregate nine-year sentence in one case, a five-year sentence in another case to be served consecutively to the first, and a six-year sentence in a third case to be served concurrently with the second but consecutively to the first. Kennedy filed motions for judicial release in the latter two cases, arguing she was eligible based on the aggregate of her sentences.

The trial court granted Kennedy's motions for judicial release in the two cases, finding her to be an eligible offender under R.C. 2929.20(B) and (C)(4) and (5). The court noted that Kennedy had served more than eight years in prison and considered her conduct in prison and the seriousness and recidivism factors. The court suspended her sentences in the two cases and placed her on community control for three years, to begin after completing her sentence in the first case. The State appealed, arguing that Kennedy had not completed her nine-year sentence in the first case and that judicial release eligibility should be determined separately for each stated prison term.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and concluded that judicial-release eligibility is determined separately for each stated prison term, informed by the aggregate of all nonmandatory prison terms imposed. The court found that the lower courts did not conduct a complete inquiry into whether Kennedy had served the requisite amount of her stated prison terms before filing her motion for judicial release. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether Kennedy completed the prescribed waiting period.

State v. Miree

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5714

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Michael P. Donnelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Jaidee Miree and Desmond Duncan were charged with murder, involuntary manslaughter, felonious assault, and other offenses related to the death of Ramses Hurley on June 16, 2019. The incident occurred during an attempted robbery where Hurley was picked up under the pretense of a drug deal. A struggle ensued, shots were fired, and Hurley was ejected from the moving vehicle, resulting in his death from blunt-force trauma. At trial, conflicting testimonies were presented regarding who initiated the violence and whether Hurley had a gun.

The trial commenced in June 2021, and the trial court instructed the jury on self-defense using the preamendment version of R.C. 2901.09, which included a duty to retreat. Miree and Duncan were found guilty of felony murder, felonious assault, and other charges, and were sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. They appealed, arguing that the trial court should have applied the amended version of R.C. 2901.09, effective April 6, 2021, which eliminated the duty to retreat.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, ruling that the amendment to R.C. 2901.09 was substantive and could not be applied retroactively to offenses committed before its effective date. A dissenting judge argued that the amendment should apply to all trials after its effective date.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and affirmed the Eighth District's decision. The court held that the amendment to R.C. 2901.09, which eliminated the duty to retreat, did not apply retroactively to acts of self-defense that occurred before the amendment's effective date. The court concluded that the trial court correctly applied the former version of the statute, and the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals was affirmed.

State v. Riley

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5712

Opinion Date: December 9, 2024

Judge: Michael P. Donnelly

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In July 2016, Michael Riley was indicted in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court for multiple charges, including aggravated murder and felonious assault, stemming from a shooting incident in Cleveland. Riley waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court found him not guilty of aggravated murder but guilty of the remaining charges under a complicity theory, sentencing him to 26 years to life in prison. Riley's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal by the Eighth District Court of Appeals, and his motion for leave to file a delayed appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio.

In October 2022, Riley filed an application for postconviction DNA testing of six shell casings found at the crime scene, arguing that advancements in DNA technology could yield new results. The State opposed the application, noting that the initial DNA testing had consumed the swabs and that Riley had not demonstrated any technological advancements that would change the outcome. The trial court summarily denied Riley's application without explanation, and later adopted the State's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law verbatim.

The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, stating that the trial court corrected its initial error by issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the trial court did not engage in the required independent analysis and merely rubberstamped the State's proposed findings. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to independently consider Riley's application for postconviction DNA testing and provide reasons for its decision as required by R.C. 2953.73(D).

State v. Smith

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5745

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Pat Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In this case, the defendant, Garry Smith, was indicted on two counts of domestic violence for an incident on March 21, 2020, involving his pregnant fiancée, B.B. Smith pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to exclude B.B.'s statements recorded on police body cameras, arguing it would violate his right to confrontation. The trial court initially denied the motion but reserved its final ruling. During the bench trial, B.B. did not appear, and the State presented evidence including body-camera footage capturing B.B.'s statements to police and EMTs.

The trial court admitted the body-camera footage, ruling B.B.'s statements were nontestimonial and fell under the excited utterance hearsay exception. Smith was found guilty and sentenced accordingly. On appeal, the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, finding that B.B.'s statements to the police were testimonial and their admission violated Smith's confrontation rights. The appellate court did not address Smith's hearsay challenge or the weight of the evidence due to its dispositive ruling on the confrontation issue.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case to determine if the admission of B.B.'s statements violated Smith's confrontation rights. The court held that B.B.'s statements to the police officer were testimonial because they were made to further the officer's investigation of a past crime, not to address an ongoing emergency. However, B.B.'s statements to the EMTs were deemed nontestimonial as they were made for the purpose of receiving medical care.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court's judgment regarding Smith's convictions for the March 21, 2020 incident and remanded the case to the Eighth District to determine the admissibility of B.B.'s statements to the EMTs under hearsay rules, conduct a harmless-error analysis, and address Smith's remaining assignments of error as necessary.

State v. Wilcox

Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

Citation: 2024-Ohio-5719

Opinion Date: December 10, 2024

Judge: Pat Fischer

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Quantez Wilcox met his ex-girlfriend, Doniesha Monroe, near a public library in Cincinnati. During their conversation, Monroe's boyfriend, Keshawn Turner, approached and argued with Monroe. Wilcox, believing Turner was reaching for a gun, shot Turner, who later died. Wilcox fled but was soon stopped and arrested by police. Meanwhile, Monroe identified Wilcox as the shooter to a police officer, whose body camera recorded the interaction. Monroe also mentioned past bad acts by Wilcox after learning he was apprehended.

The trial court admitted the body-camera footage into evidence despite Wilcox's objection, arguing it violated his right to confrontation since Monroe did not testify in court. Wilcox was convicted of multiple felonies, including murder. The First District Court of Appeals affirmed some convictions but reversed the murder conviction, ruling that Monroe's statements were testimonial and their admission violated Wilcox's confrontation rights. The court ordered a new trial for the murder charge.

The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed whether the admission of Monroe's statements violated Wilcox's confrontation rights. The court determined that Monroe's initial statements were nontestimonial as they were made during an ongoing emergency. However, statements made after Wilcox's apprehension were testimonial. The court reversed the First District's decision regarding the initial statements and remanded the case to determine their admissibility under the Ohio Rules of Evidence and to conduct a harmless-error analysis.

State v. Wallace

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Docket: S069898

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Roger J. DeHoog

Areas of Law: Civil Rights, Criminal Law

The case involves a defendant charged with multiple first-degree sexual offenses against a victim, J, who has an intellectual disability. The defendant did not dispute J's disability but argued that she was capable of consenting to the sexual acts. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal, and a jury convicted him of various charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the state failed to prove that J's disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct.

The Oregon Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that J was incapable of understanding the sexual nature of the conduct or exercising judgment to consent to it. The state petitioned for review, challenging the Court of Appeals' interpretation and application of the relevant statutes.

The Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on the interpretation of ORS 163.305(3) and ORS 163.315(1)(b), which define when a person is incapable of consenting to a sexual act due to a mental defect. The court clarified that to be capable of consent, a person must be able to appraise the nature of their conduct, which involves exercising judgment and making choices based on an understanding of the conduct's significance. The court emphasized that the state must prove that the person's intellectual disability prevented them from appraising the nature of the conduct at the time of the alleged offense.

The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a rational jury to find that J's intellectual disability rendered her incapable of appraising the nature of her conduct. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment in part, but reversed the conviction on Count 5 due to a nonunanimous jury verdict, remanding for further proceedings.

Blazer v. Department of Public Safety

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 74

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Patricia DeVaney

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Government & Administrative Law, Transportation Law

Donald Blazer was involved in a vehicle accident and voluntarily submitted to a preliminary breath test (PBT), which showed a blood alcohol content of .102 percent. However, he refused to submit to a blood draw. The South Dakota Department of Public Safety (Department) notified Blazer of its intent to disqualify his commercial driver’s license (CDL) for life, citing this refusal as a second violation of SDCL 32-12A-36, with the first being a 2014 DUI conviction. Blazer requested an administrative hearing, and the Department affirmed the disqualification of his CDL for life.

Blazer appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the Department’s decision. The circuit court concluded that Blazer’s voluntary submission to the breath test constituted a submission to a chemical analysis, meaning his refusal to submit to the blood draw could not result in the disqualification of his CDL. The Department then appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court.

The South Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s decision. The Court held that under SDCL 32-23-1.2, a preliminary breath test (PBT) is permitted and may be required in addition to a chemical test. The Court determined that Blazer’s refusal to submit to the blood draw constituted a refusal to submit to a chemical analysis as required by SDCL 32-12A-46. This refusal was a second violation under SDCL 32-12A-36, justifying the disqualification of Blazer’s CDL for life under SDCL 32-12A-37. The Court emphasized that a PBT is a preliminary test and does not fulfill the requirement for a chemical analysis under the implied consent laws.

State v. Antuna

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 78

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Mark Salter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In February 2022, a Brule County grand jury indicted Nathan Antuna for third-degree rape, alleged to have occurred in August 2016. Antuna requested the State to obtain any mental health treatment records of the victim, K.B. The State objected, stating it had no such records and was unaware if any existed. The circuit court ordered the State to determine if such records existed and provide them for an in-camera review. K.B. asserted her rights under Marsy’s Law, and Antuna served a subpoena on K.B. seeking the same records. The State moved to quash the subpoena, but the court ordered the State to investigate and obtain any records for in-camera inspection. The State filed a petition for an intermediate appeal, which was granted.

The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit directed the State to inquire about the existence of K.B.'s mental health records and provide them for in-camera review. The State objected, asserting that it had no such records and that K.B. was asserting her rights under Marsy’s Law. The court did not rule on the motion to quash but ordered the State to investigate and obtain any records. The State filed a petition for an intermediate appeal, which was granted.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and reversed the circuit court’s order. The court held that the Brady rule does not require prosecutors to investigate defense theories or compel the State to collect evidence for the defense. The court also held that the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is a trial right, not a discovery tool. The court found that SDCL 23A-13-4 does not support the circuit court’s order, as it requires prosecutors to disclose information within their possession, not to create or investigate new information. The court directed the circuit court to grant the motion to quash Antuna’s subpoena, as it did not meet the requirements for production under the Nixon factors.

State v. Bear Robe

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 77

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Scott P. Myren

Areas of Law: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law

In the early morning of March 19, 2022, Quincy Bear Robe, his girlfriend, and her friends were in a hotel room when Myron Pourier and his friends entered uninvited. An altercation ensued, during which Bear Robe and Isaac Runningshield discharged their guns, resulting in Pourier's death from two gunshot wounds. Bear Robe was found nearby with a .40 caliber handgun and later bragged about the shooting to a friend. He was indicted on charges including second-degree murder and first-degree murder but accepted a plea agreement to plead guilty to first-degree manslaughter.

The Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Pennington County, South Dakota, accepted Bear Robe's guilty plea and ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). The PSI noted Bear Robe's lack of prior criminal record, his young age, and several mitigating factors from his childhood, including mental health issues and a chaotic home environment. Despite these factors and letters of support from family and community members, the circuit court sentenced Bear Robe to 75 years in the penitentiary without any time suspended.

The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. Bear Robe argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by focusing too heavily on general deterrence and not adequately considering mitigating evidence. He also contended that the sentence was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion, as it had thoroughly considered Bear Robe's character and history, and the sentence was within the permissible range. The court also found that the 75-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense of first-degree manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision.

State v. Rudloff

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 S.D. 73

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Scott P. Myren

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Scott Rudloff was convicted of three counts of first-degree rape of a minor under 13 years old. The case began when Rudloff's stepdaughter, L.H., disclosed to her brother, Luke Volk, that Rudloff had been sexually abusing her and her sister, L.R. Law enforcement was called, and forensic interviews and medical examinations were conducted. L.H. and L.R. provided detailed accounts of the abuse, and L.R.'s examination revealed an injury consistent with sexual abuse.

The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in Lawrence County, South Dakota, denied Rudloff's motion to suppress his post-arrest custodial interview, finding that he had been advised of his Miranda rights and had not unequivocally invoked his right to counsel. The court also allowed testimony from various witnesses, including the victims, their mother Hillary, and Detective Anderson, who conducted the investigation.

Rudloff appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota, raising several issues, including the denial of his motion to suppress, the admission of certain testimonies, and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that Rudloff had impliedly waived his Miranda rights and did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the admission of testimonies and determined that the prosecutor's statements during closing arguments were within the bounds of fair argument.

The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the conviction, concluding that the circuit court did not err in its rulings and that Rudloff received a fair trial.

Ex parte Bodden

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-90,536-02

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Michelle Slaughter

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2014, Derek Andrew Bodden pleaded guilty to first-degree felony fraudulent use or possession of 50 or more items of identifying information. In 2022, he filed for a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he possessed fewer than 50 items and should be guilty of a lesser second-degree felony. He also claimed his plea was unknowing and involuntary due to a misunderstanding of the law.

The 283rd District Court of Dallas County initially accepted Bodden's guilty plea and placed him on community supervision with deferred adjudication. However, less than a year later, his community supervision was revoked, and he was sentenced to 18 years in prison. In 2019, an internal audit by the Dallas County District Attorney’s Office revealed errors in the charging and prosecution of Bodden’s case, leading to the conclusion that he possessed fewer than 50 items of identifying information.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case to determine the correct method for counting items of identifying information under Penal Code Section 32.51. The court concluded that the fraudulently possessed items listed in the indictment amounted to more than 10 but fewer than 50, making the offense a second-degree felony. The court reformed the judgment to reflect a conviction for second-degree fraudulent use or possession of identifying information and remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The court did not address whether Bodden’s plea was unknowing and involuntary, as he was granted relief on due process grounds.

Ex parte Stark

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: WR-66,940-03

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The applicant pleaded guilty to burglary of a building and was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. He did not appeal his conviction. In his application for a writ of habeas corpus, the applicant contends that he was improperly denied time credit while released on parole. The State and trial court agree with the applicant and recommend granting relief.

The 210th District Court from El Paso County reviewed the case and found that the applicant was released on parole on March 20, 2020, with approximately 1,557 days remaining on his sentence. A parole violation warrant was issued on December 14, 2022, and executed on December 15, 2022. By that time, the applicant had spent approximately 1,000 days on parole, exceeding the mid-point calculation necessary to obtain the time credit.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed the case and found that the applicant met the criteria for having his street time restored, as he is not a person described by TEX. GOV’T CODE §508.149 and had spent more than half of the remaining time on parole. The court noted that a representative from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice testified that the applicant was not receiving the time credit due to a programming issue that incorrectly combined multiple sentences. The court held that this was contrary to relevant statutes and that eligibility for street time credit should not be affected by serving more than one sentence.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas granted relief, ordering that the applicant's street time be credited to his sentence, resulting in the discharge of his sentence. Copies of the opinion were sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

State v. Hradek

Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Docket: PD-0083-23

Opinion Date: December 11, 2024

Judge: Mary Lou Keel

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

The appellee was convicted of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to her infant son, resulting in a thirteen-year prison sentence. The trial court granted her motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). The court of appeals reversed this decision and reinstated the conviction, prompting the current review.

The trial court found that the defense counsel's decision to admit a highly prejudicial 43-minute jail phone call recording, which included damaging statements by the appellee, constituted ineffective assistance. The recording portrayed the appellee negatively, showing her as self-centered, regretful of her son's birth, and not taking the situation seriously. The trial court concluded that without this evidence, there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reviewed whether the court of appeals applied the correct standard of review. The court of appeals had acknowledged the deferential standard for new-trial rulings but applied a de novo standard for IAC prejudice claims. The higher court found that the court of appeals failed to give proper deference to the trial court's findings, which were based on credibility and demeanor assessments.

The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court's ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. The trial court was in a better position to assess the impact of the prejudicial evidence on the jury. The higher court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In re Velde

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 VT 80

Opinion Date: December 6, 2024

Judge: William Cohen

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

In 2009, the petitioner pled guilty to simple assault and unlawful trespass without expressly agreeing to the facts of the charges, instead accepting the affidavits provided by police officers. Later, he was charged with new crimes, including gross negligent operation resulting in death and leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The State sought an enhanced sentence based on his prior felony convictions, including the 2009 unlawful trespass conviction. In March 2018, the petitioner pled guilty to the new charges and admitted to being a habitual offender, resulting in an enhanced sentence of nineteen years to life.

The petitioner filed a postconviction relief (PCR) petition in March 2022, arguing that the enhanced portion of his sentence was unlawful due to the lack of a factual basis for his 2009 conviction. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court, Rutland Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioner, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing without the habitual-offender enhancement, citing that the law at the time of his plea allowed for such a challenge.

The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner waived his right to challenge the predicate convictions supporting the enhanced sentence when he entered a knowing and voluntary guilty plea in 2018. The court referenced its previous decisions, including In re Torres and In re Gay, which established that a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to collaterally attack the sentence based on prior convictions. The case was remanded for consideration of the petitioner's unaddressed ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.

Commonwealth v. Carolino

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230945

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Cleo Powell

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Patrick Austin Carolino was convicted of strangulation after a bench trial. The incident involved Carolino and his then-girlfriend, Hannah Ford, who testified that Carolino choked her during an argument, causing her to experience difficulty breathing and other symptoms. Ford did not immediately report the incident to the police but did so a month later. Evidence included photographs of Ford's injuries and testimony from a nurse examiner and other witnesses.

The trial court admitted photographs of bruises on Ford's buttocks from a previous incident where Carolino allegedly whipped her with a belt. Carolino objected to this evidence, arguing it was irrelevant, constituted prior bad acts, and was beyond the scope of direct examination. The trial court overruled these objections and admitted the evidence, which it referenced in its ruling to convict Carolino.

The Court of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the belt-whipping evidence solely to attack Carolino’s credibility, violating the precedent set in McGowan v. Commonwealth. The majority found that the evidence was used improperly for impeachment on a collateral matter and that this error was not harmless.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and determined that Carolino did not preserve his argument regarding improper impeachment on a collateral matter at trial. The objections made at trial were limited to relevance, prior bad acts, and scope of direct examination, none of which specifically invoked the rule from McGowan. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, vacated its judgment, and reinstated Carolino’s conviction for strangulation.

Josephson v. Commonwealth

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

Docket: 230856

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Stephen R. McCullough

Areas of Law: Criminal Law

Junior Josephson was convicted of possession of heroin and fentanyl, as well as petit larceny. He received suspended sentences for the drug offenses and 90 days to serve on the larceny charge, with the condition that he comply with supervised probation for three years. Josephson appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that Josephson had absconded from probation and failed to stay in contact with his probation officer. The court issued a capias for his arrest, which remained outstanding at the time of the motion.

The Court of Appeals dismissed Josephson’s appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine, concluding that he forfeited his right to appellate review by absconding from probation. Josephson’s counsel filed a petition for rehearing, but the Court of Appeals denied it. Josephson then appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.

The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the fugitive disentitlement doctrine. The court held that an appellate court may consider factual developments that occur after the trial, such as a defendant becoming a fugitive, to determine whether to adjudicate the case. The court found that there was no genuine dispute about Josephson’s fugitive status, as he did not deny it. The court also held that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the appeal, as the fugitive disentitlement doctrine allows courts to dismiss appeals when a defendant is a fugitive, there is a nexus between the appeal and the fugitive status, and dismissal is necessary to effectuate the policy concerns underlying the doctrine.

The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, upholding the dismissal of Josephson’s appeal.

Aisenbrey v. State

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Citation: 2024 WY 131

Opinion Date: December 12, 2024

Judge: Suzannah G. Robinson

Areas of Law: Criminal Law, Legal Ethics, Professional Malpractice & Ethics

Jaimen Anthony Scott Aisenbrey pled guilty to two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver as part of a plea agreement. The agreement stipulated that the State would not argue against probation if the presentence investigation (PSI) recommended it. The PSI recommended a split sentence, but at sentencing, the State requested incarceration. The district court sentenced Aisenbrey to concurrent terms of eight to ten years in prison. Aisenbrey appealed, claiming the State breached the plea agreement and that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the State's recommendation.

The District Court of Platte County accepted Aisenbrey's guilty plea and the plea agreement terms. However, at sentencing, the State argued for incarceration despite the PSI's split sentence recommendation. Aisenbrey's counsel did not object to this recommendation. The district court imposed the prison sentence as requested by the State.

The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the State did not breach the plea agreement because a split sentence, which includes a period of confinement, is not equivalent to probation, which does not involve confinement. Therefore, the State's recommendation for incarceration did not violate the plea agreement. The court also found that Aisenbrey's counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State's recommendation, as there was no breach of the plea agreement to object to. The court affirmed the district court's decision.